Türkçe TercümeBorn in Vienna in 1897 into a family of the Austrian aristocracy, Erwin Lahousen fought in World War I in the Army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He insisted on continuing the war despite being severely wounded in 1916. Lahousen's experiences in the First World War led him to become a fierce opponent of the war. After the war, Lahousen continued his military career in the Army of the Weimar Republic. At the outbreak of World War II, he was a high-ranking officer in the Nazi intelligence Abwehr.
During the war, he took part in all the assassination plots against Hitler together with the Abwehr's leader, Admiral Canaris. On 20 July 1944, after the last failed assassination operation, all the assassins were captured and executed, but Lahousen, who was serving on the Eastern Front at the time and had been seriously wounded in a bombing raid one day before the assassination attempt, escaped the attention of the Gestapo and the SD.
Questioned by British intelligence after the war, Lahousen agreed to testify against the leaders of the Nazi Party. He went down in history as the No. 1 witness at the Nuremberg trials and signed the death warrant for his friends with his testimony. Released in 1947, Lahousen settled in Innsbruck, Austria, where he lived until 24 February 1955, when he died of a third heart attack.
Admiral Canaris insisted that his subordinates keep a diary during the war, saying ‘One day you will be asked to reveal’. I have translated for you the 261 pages of diaries Lahousen kept during his service and the important statements in these diaries about Germany's Caucasian policy and the operations planned in the Caucasus:
During the last days of December, a series of discussions took place between Abw. II, the Japanese, and Haydar Bammat, the leader of the Caucasian movement, with the following result.
The leadership of Haydar Bammat is transferred to the Japanese retroactively from the beginning of the war. Foreign currency payments to him are only made by the Japanese as far as German money is still required for Haydar Bammat, Abw. II only makes payments through the Japanese. Abw. II maintains the connection to Haydar Bammat through the Japanese. Haydar Bammat's work against Russia from German territory is no longer permitted.
5 July 1941
Following an instruction given by the Wehrmacht General Staff (WFSt) (Dept. L.) to exploit signs of disintegration in Soviet Russia to secure the oil region, Abw. II is preparing an operation under the code name "Tamara", the execution of which has been assigned to the Romanian counterintelligence office in Bucharest. Lieutenant Kramer was entrusted with the leadership of the operation. Task: to provide Georgians to prepare and ignite an uprising in Georgian territory. Two partial missions are planned.
a) Tamara I
This task force is made up of 16 Georgians with military training under the leadership of an NCO from the training regiment.
b) Tamara II
This task force consists of 80 Georgians trained primarily for oil protection missions under the leadership of Lieutenant Dr. Kramer.
The two groups will be set up on Romanian soil, selected, and then made available to the Ic [enemy reconnaissance and defense; intellectual] of Army High Command (AOK) 11. It is intended that these groups will advance with the front units of the 11th Army if no other means of transport to the oil region can be found.
Early on July 4th, parts of the training regiment were the first troops to reach the city center of Lemberg, occupied the important objects, and took over security against the retreating enemy. By acting quickly, particularly large supplies and warehouses were protected from destruction by the Soviet troops and from looting by the population. The battalion reported that it had broken the resistance of armored reconnaissance vehicles and had captured large amounts of weapons, including serviceable armored tanks and howitzers, as well as prisoners. The battalion also reported unimaginable Bolshevik atrocities against Ukrainian prisoners and also against German prisoners of war. Some of the prisoners were able to be freed from the prison, which was still burning.
15 July 1941
Consultation with Colonel Becker of the War Economy and Armament Office (Wi. Rue. Amt) about the planned oil protection in the Caucasus. War Economy and Armament Office was informed about Operation Tamara (I and II), as well as that the 6th Company of the Training Regiment (Major. Meissner) is available due to its experience in the Romanian oil region and that Operation Tamara and the 6th Company are subordinate to A0K 11. The difficulties of bringing these formations to the Caucasian oil region were particularly pointed out.
According to information from Colonel Becker, General Thomas intends to approach the Reichsmarschall about a large-scale airborne operation in the Caucasian oil region. It was also suggested that Tamara and the 6th Company should be assigned to the tank units to arrive in the planned area of operation as early as possible.
Meeting with State Secretary Keppler about the declaration expected shortly from the Führer on the Indian question and the Arab independence efforts. Approval for an operation with the code name "Irene", the task of which is to disrupt the Makhachkala-Baku or Makhachkala-Grozny railway line and to support local uprisings.
In the late afternoon, a meeting took place (accompanied by Captain Harbich) with the Indian leader Bose.
20 January 1942
First day of the working meeting of the Abw. II. In the presence of the head of the department, the working meeting of the Abw.II. began with a series of lectures and presentations. After a short welcome from the head of the department, I report on the year 1941, as well as instructions for the future work of the department. The guests who spoke were:
1.) Consul General Dr. Bräutigam from the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories on "current political questions in the occupied eastern territories".
2.) SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Weihmann from the Reich Security Main Office on "the current situation in emigration, with particular emphasis on the Ukrainians".
3.) SS-Standartenführer Heffmeyer from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle on "Germanness in the Soviet Union".
4.) Ambassador (ret.) D. Nadolny on "minorities in Turkey, with particular emphasis on the Caucasus." From the external members of Abw.II spoke: Captain Prof. Dr. Koch on: "Difficulties of minority deployment in Russia as a result of the Soviet system". Captain Schöneoch on "France as a starting point for Abw.II moderate deployment".
From the members of Abw.II Berlin spoke: Special leader (Sdf.) Dr. Markart on: "Abw. II moderate evaluation of uprising possibilities" and Captain Astor on "Experiences from operations at sea". Finally, Major von Haehling, the commander of the "Brandenburg" training regiment for Special Use (z.b.V.) 800, gave an "overview of the use of the LRB (Brandenburg Training regiment) in 1941" and "Experiences from the southeast and eastern campaigns, as well as the reorganization of the LRB."
In addition to the guests mentioned, representatives of the Foreign Office, the Special Staff HWK (Special Task Force for Trade War and Economic Combat Measures), and the War Economy and Armament Office, the Skl. (Naval War Command), the Army Department of the Gstb.d.H. (Military general staff officer), the Air Force Command Staff, the General Army Office, the Abw. Departments I and III, the Foreign Department, and the “W” Propaganda Department took part in the lectures.
In addition to all employees of Abw.II Berlin, ten officers of the LRB and Abw.II processors of the following Departments were present: Eastern Regions, Krakow, Warsaw, Ukraine, Romania, Vienna, Athens, Saloniki, Paris, Belgium, Stuttgart, Dijon, Oslo, Liaison Officers Abw.II with Army Groups Center and South, with the Commander of the Rear Army Area South, AOK 17, and AOK 6. Also, of the Special Staff "F", the K.O. (Abwehr war organization) Middle East and Spain, the German-Italian Officers' Commission Kronstadt, and finally the leaders of the special units "Bergmann", "Tamara II", "Shamil" and "Bajadere".
Communication from the V.O. (liaison officer) at Southern Army Groups, Major Ernst zu Eickern, that in the opinion of the 11th Army, the Caucasus operations (Operations "Tamara and Bergmann") should not begin before early summer.
The guidelines of the Eastern Ministry on Caucasus work show that Caucasian peoples are to be treated as friends. Their schools, their languages, extensive self-government, the abolition of collectives, the promotion of crafts, and religious freedom are to be granted.
The guidelines received from the “W” Propaganda department on the regulation of land conditions in Russia contain instructions on propaganda evaluation. Content: no introduction of private land ownership, but individual use of land.
Propaganda of words must correspond with propaganda of deeds.
4 June 1942
After a radio report from Bayreuth, an informant of the now retired Sergeant Ruff, V-Limon, was executed by hanging by the English in Aleppo together with 3 other Arabs.
An order that Said Shamil, who was urgently recommended to me by the Grand Mufti and who is trying to establish relations with the Wehrmacht and is offering his connections to the Mohammedan Caucasus tribes, is to be handed over to Abw. I (Major Munzinger).
4 August 1942
Department presentation to all officers of the department present in Berlin. Overview of the general situation and the status of Abw. II As part of the guidelines that I am giving for the future work of the department, I order that work against the Caucasus from Turkey be intensified.
Group A is to intensively develop Operation Ariadne and to put it into immediate action.
The leader of “O” is made aware of the importance that work in Iran will gain as the German troops approach the Caucasus further and penetrate it. The leader of “W” was instructed that his group should deal with the tasks that may arise from the temporary or long-term creation of a second front.
26 August 1942
The Grozny task force of Operation Shamil took off on the evening of 25.8 under the command of Lt. Lange and parachuted down. Radio contact has not yet been established.
A reconnaissance aircraft flight is planned for the evening of 26.8 to exchange signals with the landed task force.
The Makhach-Kala task force of the special unit Shamil is to take off and parachute down on 26.8 under the command of Lt. Johannsen.
The leader of the Maykop task force, Sergeant Moritz, arrived in Stalino on 26.8.
27 August 1942
Abw. Kdo. 201 reported that the entire group of Sergeant Moritz, which was deployed in the Maykop area, has now returned to the German troops, except one man.
28 August 1942
Some more information is now available about the operation of the "Maykop" group of the "Shamil" special unit under the command of Sergeant Moritz. This group managed to take possession of an oil refinery southeast of Maykop and protect it from destruction. Contrary to the original plan, according to which Maykop fell into the district of the Panzer Army 1, the 17th Army was actually deployed here. Unlike the Panzer AOK 1, AOK 17 was not informed about the "Shamil" operation. Sergeant Moritz and his men were captured by the German troops and kept as Russian spies for 5 days. During this time, the oil refinery was subsequently blown up by a Russian partisan troop.
29 August 1942
Return from a trip with the head of the office from Armavir to Stalino.
No news was yet available from the Grozny task force of the "Shamil" special unit. Scheduled reconnaissance was unsuccessful due to low cloud cover.
30 August 1942
Operation Mohammed (exploitation of 6 informants, including a Mohammedan cleric, by parachute jump in the Shauri (Shali) area, about 70 km southeast of Grozny, for intelligence and subversion missions) and Operation “Zug Eher" are ready to take off. Two Heinkel planes have been made available by the local air force. Takeoff is only dependent on the weather. Accompanied by the head of the department, he flew to the army headquarters early in the morning in a courier plane due to the failure of the head of the department's plane.
31 August 1942
Abw. Kdo.201, Major Arnold, reported that since no radio contact could be established with the Grozny group of the special unit "Shamil", a second wave under the leadership of Noncommissioned Officer Reckert with a strength of 12 men was dropped into the area on 29 August. Radio contact exists with this second wave. This command has not yet been able to begin operations because fairly strong Russian troops are carrying out fortification work in its immediate vicinity.
1 September 1942
Abw. Kdo. 210 reports that the second wave of the Grozny group of the "Shamil" special unit has retreated to the mountains after receiving a radio message of its own. They are supported by the population. During the night they are searched for by enemy reconnaissance units, and during the day by mounted troops. There is still no contact with the first wave.
4 September 1942
The leader of the second wave of the "Grozny" special unit's "Shamil" special unit (Noncommissioned Officer Reckert) again requested supplies of weapons and ammunition. He has no direct connection to the Major Jange operation (first wave), but he has come across people who had given shelter to members of the Lange operation. Reckert considers the situation to be favorable.
Captain von Usler was deployed to the Army Group Center to take over the leadership of “Operation Graukopf”. He reported to the head of the office in my presence. He received clear instructions that, under the guidelines set by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Russian emigrants were to be used only as interpreters or informants in the special unit, but were under no circumstances to exercise any influence on the military leadership or the intellectual support of the unit. Such influence must not be tolerated, even in a disguised form. A letter to this effect was sent to Army Group Centre.
6 September 1942
Defensive Command (Abw.) 210 (Major Arnold) reported that, according to news received from Captain Oberländer, the S-platoon of the special unit "Bergmann" had been deployed twice with success and distinction and that the 2nd Company had also performed well in combat. A doubling of the units from other Caucasian volunteers has been initiated.
7 September 1942
The regimental commander left the new location in Voroshilovsk on September 6th to visit the 2nd and 1st battalions. According to a report by the 2nd and 1st battalions by radio, it turns out that the first wave of the Grozny group of Operation Shamil had jumped out in the middle of the villages of Chishki and Dachu-Borzoi (35 km south of Grozny) due to darkness. One of the men in the first wave was killed. A radio operator jumped out in the middle of a village. The radio was lost, but the radio operator was able to save himself. 12 men who claimed to have been in Makhkety ten days ago left again without giving their destination. On September 1st and 4th, individual members of the command carried out reconnaissance in various towns. Attempts to get in touch with Major Lange and his men are continuing.
The second wave's drop point was 4 km east of Chir-Yurt. The first camp was 3 km north of Agishti by the Bass River, and the new camp was 15 km south-east. Reckert and his men are housed with gangs of the rebel population.
8 September 1942
The head of the Istanbul branch of the K.O. Middle East, Major Leverkühn, was received by me. L.A. and L.Ost took part in the meeting. In Major Leverkühn's opinion, the smuggling of informants through Turkey to the Caucasus is only possible with at least the tacit consent of the Turkish intelligence service. In Major Leverkühn's opinion, the prerequisite for the Turks is that no Reich Commissariats are set up in the Caucasus and that oil deliveries are guaranteed to the Turks.
14 September 1942
Abw.Kdo. 201, leader Major Arnold, reports by telephone: NCO Reckert, leader of the second wave of the Grozny task force of Operation "Shamil" reported that contact had been made with the first wave, Major Lange. Six men are missing from the first wave, and one man has also been killed. The best of the operation, 22 men, is with Major Lange. The supplies are intended for NCO Reckert is to be delivered to the second wave by plane on the evening of August 14th.
17 November 1942
Capt. Oberländer, leader of Operation Bergmann, gave a presentation:
1.) The Pr. AOK 1 has ordered the expansion of Operation Bergmann. The Panzer Army will ensure budgetary security and apply to OKH via Army Group (H.Gr.) for the necessary German training teams.
2.) The review of the Turk battalions by Capt. Oberländer is time-limited and will be carried out alongside the main work.
3.) Capt. Oberländer reported that the front's concerns about the impact of the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Caucasus are being brought to the attention of the relevant key positions and personalities through official channels. The Eastern Ministry, the Reich Marshal, and Reich Leader of the SS are responsible. Decision that Abw.II cannot intervene on behalf of the Ukrainians who have been hardened and convicted by the Romanians, even if they are former informants, as they relate to political offenses.
Capt. Partl (Ref. S 08) went to Frei Waldau in the Sudetenland to attend the mountain training course of the special commando.
23 January 1943
Abw. 201 reported by telex that reliable, trained informants were being deployed in the Voroshilovsk and Maykop areas, who would remain in these areas in the event of evacuation by German troops with the task of disrupting enemy supplies.
5 May 1943
There is a new report from Ic of the 17th Army that Caucasian Mountain peoples are in revolt, with a focus near Grozny. This forced the Soviets to deploy several divisions, including tank units, to combat the revolt. This is to be regarded as a success of Operation Shamil.
21 June 1943
According to a communication from Field Marshal Keitel dated 8.6.43, the Führer decided that propaganda for General Vlasov's People's Army would be approved without assuming any obligation.
In addition to General Vlasov, similar personalities should be highlighted as representatives of the Caucasian peoples, the Turkestanis, the Tartars, and the Cossacks. Kajum-Chan is designated as the representative of the Turkestanis, and the former Soviet Major i.G. Dundaginski as the representative of the Azerbaijani people. Abw.II is asked to help highlight the others. This solution was suggested by Abw.II.
During his inspection trip to the occupied eastern territories, Reich Minister Rosenberg gave a lecture to the officers of Army Group South on the German goals in the eastern region. According to the Ic A.0. memorial paper, he said something like this:
The war aim is not the Restoration of a united, indivisible Russia, but rather the dismantling of the Soviet Union according to international economic conditions. In this case, no political ties are to be entered into by the German side, but only the restoration of the vital interests of the population. The agrarian decree of June 8th, the promotion of crafts, and the improvement of the situation of factory workers are the German stages on this path. Various sides are trying to achieve certain successes on the Eastern Front at the price of certain concessions. However, this is absurd, since such concessions are only of immediate value and after 50 years would give rise to further wars. It is therefore better not to make any cheap concessions at present and to hold out.
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 22 December 2024