In the final days of World War II, it was evident to everyone that Nazi Germany would lose the war. While Wehrmacht dissolved was disintegrated on all fronts, the German high command began to drive Caucasian "Volunteers" who had joined the German ranks to liberate their homeland from Soviet occupation to the front lines in places that had nothing to do with the Caucasus, such as France, Holland, Italy, and Denmark. The Caucasian Committee in Berlin refrained from an openly hostile attitude toward the Nazi Government for the safety of Caucasians at the front in case the German High Command would carry out retaliatory actions. Committee members Alikhan Kantemir, Ahmed Nabi Magoma, Abdurrahman Fatalibeyli, Giwi Gabliani, Abbas Bey Atamalibek, and Armik Djamalian met in the last days of March 1945 and prepared a letter to the German authorities to prevent Caucasian soldiers from perishing in wars that did not belong to them. Six weeks before the end of the war, on March 26, 1945, a letter signed by Alihan Kantemir and Ahmet Nabi Magoma underlined that Caucasian soldiers did not want to fight on fronts that did not concern Caucasians, and demanded that these soldiers be kept ready for the Caucasian Independence Army, which would be established to fight for the freedom of the Caucasus in a new front against the Soviets in the future. This letter was also the last diplomatic initiative of the Caucasian Committee against the German Government. The Germans were worrying for their own lives and they even did not respond to this letter. Within a few days after the letter was sent, the members of the committee in Berlin had left the war-torn city and leaked to northern Italy where thousands of Caucasian refugees gathered to surrender to Allies.
You can read the English translation of this document below. This document can be considered as the last critical official diplomatic document of the Nazi alliance of the Caucasians that was made in the hope of liberating the Caucasus from the Soviet occupation.
Registered members of our library can access the original German document from the Primary Sources in our library via the link below.
Click; Bericht, Über die kaukasischen Freiwilligen verbande in der deutschen Wehrmacht
Caucasian Committee Berlin, March 26, 1945
Report About the Caucasian Voluntary Units in the German Wehrmacht
Hatred of the Bolshevik occupiers and traditional friendship with Germany were the reasons why, after the declaration of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, the majority of Caucasians who had been mobilized into the Red Army, as well as Caucasians who were staying abroad, sided Germans converted and volunteered for the common struggle with the Soviet Union, for the liberation of their homeland, the restoration of their independence and the new order in Europe.
In the beginning, smaller Caucasian units were set up, such as in 1941/42: Georg, Thamara I, Thamara II Caucasian special unit Bergmann.
The Caucasian Legion was created on 22, 2,1942, from which emerged en field battalions, namely:
10 Armenian Field Battalions
8 Azerbaijani Field Battalions 804, 805, 806, 807, 817, 818, 819, 1/111
12 Georgian Field Battalions 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, II/198, II/4, I/9, 822, 823, 824, 1/1
8 North Caucasian Field Battalions 800, 802, 803, 831, 836, 836, 842, 843.
From the Caucasian Bergmann Special Unit, which was set up by the OKW at the time and was then subordinate to the OKH, 3 field battalions were created:
- Georgian Bergmann
- Azerbaijani Bergmann
- North Caucasian Bergmann
As part of the 162, ID. became the 314th azerb . Inf. Reg. established, in the Turk, - Batl. 1000 stood the 1st and 2nd companies from Azerbaijanis. At the same time, construction, work, and supply units were set up in all army groups and the GG.
The number of auxiliaries and volunteers in German units from each Caucasian tribe amounted to about 5-7000 men, a total of about 25,000 men.
Numerous special units set up by the OKW, e.g. Brandenburg training regiment for ZbV operations, are difficult to state numerically due to absolute secrecy. In addition, there are the volunteers in the Luftwaffe and Major Schu's unit, in the Waffen-SS, such as the Ostmuselmanische SS regiment with a strength of 2,000 men, the Caucasian cavalry units currently in the development stage, the volunteers deployed in the SD, Sipo, and OT. The number of Caucasians armed on the German side is thus:
1) in legions and field battalions
Armenians 11,000
Azerbaijanis 13,600
Georgians 14,000
North Caucasians 10.100 total 48,700 men
2) in construction and replenishment units
Armenians 7,000
Azerbaijani 4,795
Georgians 6,800
North Caucasians 3,000 total 21,595 men
3) in German units 25,000 men
7,000 men in the Waffen SS, SD and Luftwaffe
A total of 102,295 men
Except for a few units, all the Caucasian legions and the field battalions were deployed in the GG or the Ukraine. As we know, there were many difficulties to be overcome and major mistakes made, such as:
1.) The formation was not carried out in the Reich, which would have had a decidedly more favorable effect on the legions, but in the GG. under the effect of the most intense enemy propaganda.
2.) Poor conditions in the camps (almost 50% of the Caucasian POWs died of starvation and cold in 1941/42), which exerted a persistent, unfavorable mood on the volunteers.
3.) The wrong deployment principle of the colonial troops. No emphasis on careful training of the state's own leader and sub-leader corps.
4.) Psychologically unprepared and in the majority unsuitable German personnel (the result of this: mistreatment, beatings, unfair distribution of the sutler's goods, food, etc.).
5.) Too short training period (about 2 3 months), insufficient training and equipment.
6.) Missing provisions on rank insignia, war pay, family support, disciplinary penal code, and care.
7.) The lack of political representation, would have given the volunteers a justified political goal. This is the biggest mistake.
The special unit Bergmann, which was trained and treated according to completely different principles, stood as an island among all Caucasian units. The Bergmann Association was a successful attempt at cooperation between Caucasians and Germany. Not only militarily, but also politically. When carrying out this test, we asked the unit commander, Captain Prof. Dr. Theodor Oberländer, who, with his idealism, honesty, and knowledge of the Caucasian problem and the problems of the East in general, without any guidelines or help from above, performed his task brilliantly and thus provided a reliable bridgehead in German-Caucasian cooperation has created.
In 1942 almost all battalions were deployed at the front. Despite the mistakes and grievances already mentioned, they have proven themselves well and have often earned recognition from the highest German command posts. A large number of volunteers were rewarded with various decorations such as Wound Badges Assault Badges, Bravery, and Merit Badges. Unfortunately, at that time there was no decree awarding Caucasians with German medals for bravery.
The majority of battalions came to the Caucasian front, such as:
|
Azerb. Feldbat. |
804 |
on the Kuban (which had received the name "Aslan" "Löwe") |
|
|
805 and 806 |
near Malgobek and Ordzhonikidze |
|
Field Battalion 1/111 |
|
|
|
Armenian Fieldbtl. |
809, 810 |
in the primeval forests and gorges of the North Caucasus |
|
Georgian Fieldbtl . |
795 |
at the Baksan and Uruch |
|
Georgian Feldbt . |
1/9, II/4 796 and 1/1 |
on the Kuban |
|
North Kaukas . field btl . |
842, 843, 803, 836, 835 |
on the Kuban, Nalchik, Malgobek , Cherek |
|
The Caucasian Special Union Bergmann |
|
on Terrek , Mozdok , Malgobek , Starotedorovskaya , Baksan and Nalchik |
Almost all units have suffered great losses during hard combat use, e.g. e.g.:
|
batl . |
805 |
85% |
|
batl . |
806 |
70% |
|
batl . batl . |
842, 843 11/4, 1/9, 796 |
40% 40-50% |
|
Berman |
|
25% |
|
batl . |
810 |
50% |
|
batl . |
795 |
15-20% |
After the retreat of the Caucasian units, a part was sent across the Kuban to the Crimea and after the Crimean peninsula was cut off from the mainland (from October 1943 to April 1944 evacuation of the Crimea), they brilliantly proved themselves under the heaviest nerve strain. The Wehrmachtsbericht of October 1943 mentioned the bold struggle of the Caucasian units at Perekop and on the Sivash.
At the same time, the Caucasian units proved themselves against the Bolshevik gangs in the Balkans and Italy.
With the founding of the Caucasian liaison staff in October 1943, progress was made in political development. The goal of the liaison staff was to immediately put the political cooperation of the Caucasus with Germany on a healthy foundation and first to start with the abolition of all grievances in the Caucasian units and to build up a healthy base of the Caucasian Liberation Army.
The Reich Ministry East and General der Kavallerie Koestring, who was appointed General of the Volunteer Associations in 1943, were very accommodating as far as possible.
Shortly before this time in 1944, the Caucasian units were deployed across the continent of Europe, specifically in the west: from Holland to southern France, like
|
Armenian |
battalion |
812 |
in Holland |
|
Azerbaijan. |
" |
807 |
at St. Raphael |
|
Azerbaijan. |
" |
804 |
temporarily in France |
|
Georgian |
" |
822 |
password |
|
Georgian |
" |
795 |
Cherbourg |
|
Georgian |
" |
823 |
Gernsey Island |
|
Georgian |
" |
797 |
at La-Haye-du- Poys ( Graneville ) |
|
Georgian |
" |
798 |
St Nazeire |
|
Georgian |
" |
799 |
near Perygeux |
|
Georgian |
" |
II/4, 1/9 |
Catre area |
|
North Caucasus |
" |
800, 835, 836 |
in Normandy |
|
North Caucasus |
" |
803 |
in Holland |
Armenian batl . 814
I.Georgian Batl . Bergmann
North Caucasian batl . 842, 843
III.North Caucasian batl . Bergmann
in Italy Azerbaijan . Reg. within the 162nd ID.
Georgian Btl. II/198
on the eastern front several battalions remained, e.g
Azerb . bt . 817, 818, 819, 1/111, II/Bergmann
Azerb . reg. East Moslem SS Weapons Association.
The bulk of the Caucasian construction, supply, and engineering units remained on the eastern front.
The year 1944 presented our units with the most difficult tests. From the beginning of the invasion, our battalions were in the first line on the Atlantic Wall, facing an enemy - numerically - and material superiority.
They were up to all these trials. The Wehrmacht report of July 1944 announced the valiant battles of the Georgian units on the Normandy peninsula near Cherbourg. The following battalions were lost in the invasion:
Georgian Batl . 795, 797, 798, II/4, 1/9
Azerbaid . batl . 807
North Cauc . batl . 800
Georgian Legion
North Cauc . legion
a large part of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Legions, apart from the Georgian Batl . 823, which is still on the Channel Island of Gernsey to this day . The North Caucasian Btl 835 and 836 also took part in the fighting in France and suffered around 30-45% casualties. Equally good performances and heavy casualties were reported by the Caucasian labor units in the West, as well as by the troops of auxiliaries and volunteers deployed within the German units. E.g. with the 353rd ID. There were about 40 to 50 Azerbaijanis in each company, totaling over 1500 men. In the fighting at St. Chateauaulin and St. Lo, almost all were killed. Several Caucasians were deployed with German artillery units, e.g. B. at the marine anti-aircraft brigade in St. Nazeire was a Georgian battery. At Biaritz , by the coastal artillery, another Georgian battery.
Recent events on the Eastern Front have claimed heavy casualties from our units, e.g. B. the Azerb . Btl. 817, where only 107 men are left (was at Reichenbach in the GG.) 818 at Lemberg, 819 at Pulawy in the GG. The battalions mentioned were overrun by the first wave of Bolshevik attacks, and to this day there is no information about their whereabouts. in Azerb . 1/111 and II/Bergmann near Warsaw only 150-250 remained per unit. The construction, supply, and engineering units in the army groups suffered the heaviest losses. At the moment there are still some construction, post-production, and pioneering units in Kurland and near Königsberg.
In Croatia are fighting: I. Georg . batl . Bergmann
III. North Cauc . batl . Bergmann
North Cauc. batl . 842 and 843
The units mentioned above went through heavy retreats from Greece at the time. The Ostmuselmanisches SS Regiment was used in the fights against gangs in Slovakia.
In Italy this is located: Azerb . Reg. within the 162nd ID
Georg . Btl. II/198
and in the deployment stage d. Caucasian SS cavalry association.
In Denmark, the Georgian Btl. 799 is protecting the coast.
The Caucasian Legions are appointed to the Operational Battalion to do entrenchment work.
50,000 men, i.e. a loss of about 48-50% of the deployed Caucasians.
These are heavy losses:
I.Ethnically seen:
1 . considering the destruction of the best national forces by the 25-year rule of Bolshevism,
2 . if one adds the losses in the Red Army of the forcibly mobilized Caucasians,
3 . if one considers that 50% of the defected and captured Caucasians died in 1941/42 from hunger and cold in the camps,
4 . if you take into account the drop in births, which is currently extremely high in the Caucasus as well.
II.From a military point of view:
It must be borne in mind that a replacement is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. If further development continues, it can lead to the fact that no more Caucasian volunteer associations can be set up.
There are currently around 28,000 Caucasians in German captivity. The care and feeding of this mass and the selection of the volunteers have not been carried out seriously and radically enough until now.
As mentioned above, the Caucasian Liaison Staff had many difficulties to overcome in their responsible work. In this cooperation, on this long and difficult path, a lot has been achieved; propagandistic and defensive support for the volunteers raised their fighting spirit and reliability.
As a political event of the liaison staff in cooperation with the General of the Volunteer Associations, it should be mentioned: the equal rights of the volunteers compared to the German soldiers in every respect, the establishment of a state-owned officer corps through war schools and courses have of course increased the reliability of the troops. Today they already have their Caucasian battalion under their leadership and work is continuing to bring all the others under their leadership as well. The construction of the Caucasian regiment has also begun, as well as the preparatory work of a Caucasian liberation army,
A Caucasian committee and a Caucasian military council were formed along with the Central Office East of the SS main offices to coordinate military and political cooperation between the peoples of the Caucasus.
Lieutenant-General Bicherakhov was asked to join the Caucasian Military Council, first as Inspector General of the Caucasian Liberation Army and later as Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. On March 19, 1945, the German Reich government recognized the Caucasian liaison staff to the National Committee and also the already existing Caucasian Committee.
The position of the Caucasian Committee on everything is clear, including General Vlasov's Committee. The Caucasian Committee welcomes this movement and sees in it a partner in the intellectual struggle against Bolshevism. Caucasians are willing to stand with him in a common struggle, but not under him.
Despite all the difficulties, the Caucasian Committee believes that it can carry out its tasks in the decisive phase of this war. For the full and successful engagement of all Caucasians in the struggle for destiny in Europe, the implementation of the following measures is necessary:
1. The concentration of all Caucasian prisoners of war in an assembly camp, where a suitable part is trained as a replacement for the Caucasian Liberation Army and another part is sent to work.
Delaying this measure entails the risk of losing valuable and irreplaceable human material.
2. To combine the construction and supply units used in the army group and to use them in the Caucasian Liberation Army for the decisive battle.
The practice has shown that previous operations have led to inefficient use of resources because the men received extremely poor treatment and hardly any adequate care. As a result, a large part was lost without bringing any benefit.
3. The construction of the liberation army is to be carried out at an increased pace and, instead of a regiment, it is to begin with the construction of a division. But this includes the presence of a Caucasian weapons school.
4. Summary of all propaganda at the National Committee.
5. Creation of a German liaison staff at the National Committee through the incorporation of authorized representatives of German agencies: East Ministry, SS Main Office, Reich Security Main Office, Ministry of Propaganda, Foreign Office, OKH/Gen. i.e. Freiw.Verb ., OKW/ WPf.
6. Preventing the dualism of the Caucasian Committee and the Committee of the Peoples of Russia.
There have already been cases where the Peoples' Committee of Russia tried to recruit Caucasian volunteers. This puts the troops in an unhealthy state and has a corrosive effect on the volunteers, which must be avoided at all costs.
7. The Caucasians have too few officers and Unterfuhrer to set up good formations separately within the army and the Waffen-SS. The Caucasian Committee desires to have a united Caucasian Liberation Army.
A joint discussion between the Caucasian Committee, Eastern Ministry, SS Main Office, Reich Security Main Office, Propaganda Ministry, Foreign Office, OKH/Gen. i.e. Freiw.Verb ., OKW/ WPr ., may be necessary.
Alihan Kantemir
The Chairman Caucasian
committees
Ahmet Nabi Magoma
Secretary General of
Caucasian Committee
Cem KUMUK
Istanbul, 7 July 2023