Türkçe TercümeLet's pick up this week where we left off last week...
While Haydar Bammat and the Group Kavkaz forged a strong alliance with Japan, the Prometheans aimed to get closer to the Anglo-French axis but could not gain the sympathy of the allies, who were not at all willing to break with Stalin. Despite Haydar Bammat's very concrete projects for the anti-Bolshevik struggle and the independence of the Caucasus, the German Reich insisted on repeating the mistakes of World War I, unable to formulate a concrete policy with incompatible and inconsistent decisions between institutions. The Gestapo, despite knowing that the Musavat Azerbaijanis were Prometheans, and the Menshevik Georgians were supporting the Allies, allowed these groups to operate in Germany and tried at every opportunity to prevent the work of the Group Kavkaz, which had the full support of the Ministry of War and the Japanese Allies. As a matter of fact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop, German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which was signed only a week before the outbreak of the war, had a shocking effect on everyone.
Under these circumstances, Haydar Bammat's letter to Colonel Yamamoto, one of the representatives of the Japanese command in Europe, not only brought an explanation to the political balances of the era but also gave messages that could serve as a basis for today's balances. This document, which has remained in the dark until today, at the same time clarifies many issues awaiting explanation in the relations between Nazi Germany and the North Caucasian immigrants and fills a major gap in the works written on the subject to date.
(Click on the image to access the original file)
Colonel Yamamoto,
Our connection with the Germans dates back to 1936. It was established with the help and direct mediation of Lieutenant Colonel [Shigeki] Usui and General [Hiroshi] Oshima. Cooperation with the Germans was based on their recognition of a certain political program.
After repeated meetings with representatives of the Military Department, with whom I explained my views on the Caucasian question in detail, this program was presented by me, in the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Usui, to an interdepartmental commission specially convened for this purpose. The commission consisted of the head of Ribbentrop's office in the Foreign Ministry, Mr. [Hans] von Raumer, a representative of the War Ministry, Major [Helmuth] Groscurth, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior from the town of Landsdorf, and another German whose name I do not recall, who represented the Gestapo.
The essence of this program, as you know, was as follows:
The Caucasus, located on the border of Asia and Europe, belongs to the Asian world by the origin of religion and culture of the majority of its population. Two small Christian nations: Georgians and Armenians, surrounded on all sides by the Muslim Sea, have always lived in the element of Asian nations, being under Turkish and Persian protectorate before joining Russia.
The Muslim peoples of the Caucasus, without exception, and part of the Armenian and Georgian population, sincerely desire their independence and cooperation with their Muslim neighbors, both inside and outside the Caucasus. The majority of Armenians and Georgians reject the Muslim and Asian worlds and want to remain under Russian rule. They want to establish, with the help of some large Christian power, independent states of Armenia and Georgia and, having rounded them out at the expense of Turkish territory, to become the basis for a large European policy directed against the peoples of the East. When, during the Russian Revolution of 1917, four republics were created in the Caucasus: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the North Caucasus, the Azerbaijan and North Caucasian republics sought support from Turkey.
Armenia was oriented towards England and France and, under the Treaty of Sevres, received a significant part of Turkish Anatolia. This treaty, as is well known, could not be carried out because of the resistance put up by Turkey. Georgia received the exclusive patronage of Germany. We witnessed how German soldiers, dressed in Georgian uniforms, as part of Georgian units and under the command of German officers. With weapons in hand, they prevented the Turks, who wanted to help the Azerbaijanis liberate Baku, then occupied by the Bolsheviks, from passing by the shortest route. According to the friendship treaty concluded with the Ottoman Empire and signed by myself, a division was formed in Turkey from our Circassian emigrants under the command of a Circassian general in the Turkish service. The task of this division was to come to us in the North Caucasus and provide our government with personnel for our regular army. This unit was supposed to pass along the Georgian Military Highway and rush to the aid of our Chechen and Ingush irregular units fighting with the Russians around Vladikavkaz.
This part was not allowed by the socialist government of Georgia, which without the support of Germany would never have dared to commit such impudence. The division had to wait for the capture of Baku and go to us by a roundabout route through Azerbaijan.
As a result, at the most critical moment, we lost four precious months for organizing our army...
The rapid course of events on the Western Front and the collapse of the Central European powers forced Turkey to withdraw its units from the Caucasus / One of the points of the armistice with England was the obligation to withdraw all Turkish units from the Caucasus; at this time, only half of our territory would be liberated from the Russians.
Thus, Germany, with its short-sighted policy of patronizing Christian Georgia against the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus, prevented the timely organization of Azerbaijan and North Caucasian Republics and bears a significant share of responsibility for the failure of the Caucasus' struggle for its independence, first against the White Russian armies, then against the Reds. Having pointed out these mistakes made by Germany in 1918, I defended the following thesis before my German listeners:
The struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus for their independence is a struggle against Russia, which occupies the Caucasus. Consequently, within the country, this struggle must first of all rely on those elements of the Caucasus which, in terms of their will and independence, and hostility towards Russia, cannot cause any doubt.
Such elements are the peoples of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, who have nothing in common with Russia in religion, race, and culture. The peoples of the North Caucasus, who occupy all the strategic routes leading from the Russian plain to Transcaucasia and who preserve the traditions of many years of struggle against Russia, will have to play a particularly important role in this regard.
Christian Georgia, which voluntarily joined Russia in 1798 and is linked by strong ideological threads to the Russian socialist public, like Armenia, hostile to the Turkic and Islamic elements both within the Caucasus and outside it, provides less guarantee of the fidelity of a serious and long-term anti-Russian policy.
It is unacceptable to repeat the mistake of 1918 and create several independent republics in the Caucasus, which will inevitably compete and be at odds with each other, and Armenia and Georgia, following the example of their recent comparatively historical past, will very soon become a springboard for Russian intrigues.
To successfully carry out its anti-Russian mission, the Caucasus must become a united and militarily and politically strongly centralized state, that is, a federation in which, with complete equality of the inhabiting peoples, the central government would give absolute guarantees that under all circumstances it would firmly and unwaveringly stand in the position of defending its independence against Russia and all other possible enemies of an independent Caucasus.
The necessity of political unity in the Caucasus is also dictated by the fact that the Caucasian Isthmus is a geographical and economic whole, in which all parts balance each other. Thus, Batum is the natural port of Baku, with which it is connected by oil pipelines. Transcaucasia does not have enough bread and is fed by imports from the North Caucasus. Strategic defense of Transcaucasia against Russia is impossible without possession of the North Caucasian Mountain defiles, through which two railway lines pass, one along the Caspian and the other along the Black Sea, and two highways: the Georgian Military Highway and the Ossetian Military Highway.
However, no matter how well organized the Caucasian state is, with its 10-12 million population it will not be able to resist Russia on its own.
The interests of the Caucasus imperatively dictate that it enters into a system of common defense against a powerful northern enemy with the countries of the Muslim East lying to the south and east of it: Turkey, Iran, and Turkestan, equally threatened by unstoppable Russian expansion.
Therefore, the Caucasus must not only renounce any territorial claims to these countries and honestly and sincerely recognize the current borders, but also seek military and political rapprochement with them, while, of course, fully preserving its independence.
However, this orientation toward neighboring Asian states is not a sufficient guarantee for the independence of the Caucasus. The Caucasus must achieve an alliance and patronage of the most powerful Asian state - Japan, which has now firmly established itself on the Asian continent and has a long common border with Russia.
In the West, the Caucasus must seek friendship and alliance with Germany, whose interests in the East of Europe clash so sharply with the Slavic world, in which the leading role has always belonged and probably will still belong to Russia.
The independence of the Caucasus, guaranteed by Germany, Japan, and Turkey, involved in the sphere of the coordinated German-Japanese policy aimed at the dismemberment of Russia and the liberation of the peoples oppressed by it, will be one of the foundations of a strong and just legal order in the East of Europe and Western Asia.
These considerations were received very amicably by all those present and not only did not cause any objections but on the contrary met with complete sympathy. Lieutenant Colonel Usui concluded by stating that Gaidar Bammat's position finds full approval in the Japanese Army, which will unconditionally and in every way support Mr. Bammat's policy and only this policy.
Mr. von Raumer, having expressed his complete agreement with everything I had said, stated that he and his colleagues at the meeting would make a report to their superiors and that I would be informed of the results.
After some time, Lieutenant Colonel Usui informed me that the Germans had accepted my program in its entirety and were ready to enter into practical cooperation, and the talk was about transferring a certain amount of money to me for expenses. I told Lieutenant Colonel Usui that a simple verbal acceptance of my program was not enough for me and that I would like to have a written document recording the basic principles of my cooperation with the Germans. Without this condition, I refused to begin practical work and accept the money. A few months later, I met with Admiral [Wilhelm] Canaris in Bremen, and we signed an agreement with the following content:
1-Admiral Canaris declares that they will provide every support to Gaidar Bammat in his policy aimed at creating a single federal Caucasian state.
2- Gaidar Bammat undertakes not to enter into any agreements with other states, except for Japan and Turkey, to achieve his goals, without prior agreement with Admiral Canaris.
3- Mr. Admiral Canaris will not enter into any relations with other Caucasian groups and individuals on Caucasian issues without prior agreement with Gaidar Bammat.
4- Gaidar Bammat undertakes his part not to enter into relations with any other institutions in Berlin besides Admiral Canaris.
5- When the appropriate political moment comes, Admiral Canaris undertakes to do everything necessary to transform this agreement into an act of state on the part of Germany.
6- This document will be kept in the papers of Major Groscurth. A copy of this document was given to Lieutenant Colonel Usui with the request that he forward it to the Imperial Japanese General Staff.
A similar agreement was signed a few months later between me and General Oshima.
These are the foundations on which I developed our activities in Berlin. They were expressed in the publications of magazines in seven languages, in intelligence work in the Caucasus, and in steps aimed at rapprochement with the high military command in Turkey, etc.
My activities and those of my staff in Germany were not without difficulties. These difficulties were encountered mainly on the part of the Gestapo.
A deep hostility was felt all the time both from the Ministry of Propaganda, which completely hushed up our publications, and from the party, in particular the A.P.A. [Abwehr Propaganda Abteilung], which openly supported representatives of the hostile group "Prometheus" who sometimes came to Berlin from Paris and Warsaw, and the Azerbaijani section of this group even published its own magazine in Berlin, which contained the most indecent attacks on us.
Despite the loyal support of the War Department at all times, we could not achieve the elimination of these abnormalities. This situation continued until the beginning of the war.
When the German-Soviet Treaty was concluded, my deputy in Berlin, Alikhan Kantemir, was informed that all our activities must cease and all our publications must be suspended.
At the beginning of January of the current year, when I arrived in Berlin, Admiral Canaris, whom I wanted to see, unfortunately, I was unable to meet. Colonel [Erwin] Lahausen told me that according to the agreement concluded between the German military department and the Japanese, formal communication between us ceased. All our activities on German territory also cease, but our relations essentially remain the same and the actual communication will also be maintained through the Japanese. “We were forced to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia,” Colonel Lahausen stated, “but we had the same agreement with Poland, what have you seen of this before...”
To this, I replied that we had received the news of the German-Russian treaty with great pain, but we were prepared to admit that it was a sad necessity for Germany in the current international situation. We hope that this treaty is only a short-term episode in German-Russian relations and we will eagerly await its end. As for us, the meaning of our existence lies in the struggle for the independence of our country, which is occupied by the Russians, and the Bolsheviks have been and remain our implacable enemies. What I mean is to transfer the center of our work to another country, where we will continue our activities without changing a single comma in them.
As for our attitude towards Germany, we have been and remain her friends, believing that the treaty signed by me with the Admiral, although suspended until happier days, retains full force for both parties. I would like to receive confirmation of this from the Admiral. Colonel Lahausen could not, of course, answer in the absence of Admiral, but he did not object to my declaration a single word. Majors Stolze, Döring, and Dr. Market were present. Having arrived in Berlin today, I have ascertained that Admiral Canaris, it turns out, has declared to the Gestapo that my activities and those of my group have been liquidated. The Gestapo knows nothing about the true nature of the agreement concluded between you and the German military department and between me and them. As a result, the Gestapo has begun to practice its own policy in the Caucasian question, diametrically opposed in essence and character to my program. The Gestapo supports Georgian groups hostile to the idea of orienting the Caucasus to the East; those elements, partly openly and partly underground, are agitating against the "yellow peril", against the Muslim neighbors of the Caucasus, and are counting on Stalin in the expectation that the Russian-German alliance will lead to a war with Turkey, in which Georgia will round out its borders.
The question of publishing a Georgian newspaper in Berlin under the leadership of the above-mentioned elements was raised.
In Warsaw, the leadership of the Caucasian emigration is concentrated in the hands of former “Prometheans”, whose leaders are currently in Paris openly supporting England and France in the present war. In all this, there is much ignorance of the Caucasian reality and misunderstanding, even of Germany's own interests in the East. However, the continuation of this new policy in the Caucasian question under the leadership and hands of Georgian former Marxists and narrow nationalists who are hostile to the entire Muslim and Asian world may lead to very unfortunate complications.
We cannot allow such a state of affairs. The question is put to us clearly and simply: either Germany remains faithful to the agreement existing between us, which is only temporarily frozen, and then the hostile activity of our political opponents to our ideas cannot and will not be tolerated. Or Germany abandons the policy that it has been pursuing in our question based on my plan, and then we must consider that joint work with Germany is impossible...
In this matter, as in our position and the military conflict taking place in Europe, my comrades, we want to follow the line that will be adopted by Japan, for the well-being of the Caucasus and all the oppressed peoples of the Muslim East and Asia is connected with Japan.
Haydar Bammat
As it can easily be understood from this letter, Germany could not formulate a coherent Caucasus policy in World War II as it had in World War I, and could not turn it into a concrete military project. As a matter of fact, after the failure of Hitler's Operation Typhoon and his heavy defeat at the gates of Moscow, the Caucasus was off the agenda until Hitler shifted his armies to the south of Russia and Stalingrad in early 1942. From the very beginning, Haydar Bammat considered an alliance with the Japanese more reliable than with the Germans. He believed that if the Japanese Army squeezed Stalin through Manchuria, the Soviet defeat would be inevitable. However, despite the absolute defeat of the Germans in front of Moscow, the Japanese high command, instead of squeezing Stalin in the east, moved the Japanese war machine to the Pacific Ocean and attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, causing the covert US support to the Allies to become overt, and was forced to exhaust all his strength fighting the US in the Pacific.
History would repeat itself and all the odds would be stacked against the Caucasus once again...
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 19 February 2025
p.s. The figures appear on the Header Image are (from left): Lieutenant Colonel Shigeki Usui, General Hiroshi Oshima, Haydar Bammat, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Colonel Erwin von Lahousen, Major Helmuth Groscurth