Enrico Insabato and Italy on the Caucasian Liberation Cause | Historical Memory of The North Caucasus

22/06/2023

In the wake of the First World War Italy could not enjoy the gains of the war as much as her allies Britain and France. One of the territories where Italy was given a lesser function role was the Caucasus. The first phase of Italian interest in the Caucasus ended in apparent failure. Due to heavy losses of the Italian banks who invested in the region subsequently, official diplomacy did not seem to get involved in Caucasian affairs at all. Although the first contact between Italian officials and the North Caucasian political immigration started in mid-1919 at Italian Embassy in Switzerland, no considerable progress was achieved due to the lack of interest on the Italian side. This did not change until 1926 when one of the prominent members of the Georgian immigration, Georges Gwazava started contacts with the Italian government. The early contacts between Caucasian political immigration and Italy, which were dominated by the Georgian Mensheviks and the Mountaineers and Azerbaijani groups around them affiliated with the Prometheus Movement, and sponsored by the Polish government, did not develop properly due to the highly reactive behavior of the Georgian Mensheviks, which put the Italian government in trouble in international relations. During the interwar period, Italy aimed to compensate for its disadvantageous position after World War I, and under the rule of the Fascist leader Benito Mussolini, they focused on repairing the damaged national pride of Italy.

Enrico Insabato's emergence on the political stage as an advisor to Benito Mussolini on Eastern politics marked important changes that occurred in Italy's view of the Caucasus. From the early 1900s, Insabato had served as a government envoy to contact Sufi groups, Senussis, and Ibadis as part of efforts to lure the Islamic public, with the support of the French orientalist René Guénon, to facilitate the Italian conquest of Libya. Then we witness another Georgian, Shalva Karumidze, a National-Democrat on the political stage offering Italy the possibility of sharing the riches of the Caucasus with Britain, and proposing through Insabato, to enter into a partnership with Great Britain and Germany, with the benevolence of Turkey. Karumidze, who is closer to Haydar Bammat’s group, Kavkaz, than to the "Prometheans" under the influence of Georgian Menshevism, seems to act here more under the impulse of the German authorities than as a spokesperson for the so-called " right-wing " nationalist currents. Insabato also seemed to prefer the nationalists linked to Haydar Bammat, to the other nationalists opposed to any compromise with socialism, but also to any concession concerning the southern borders of the Caucasus. In particular, he shared the criticisms expressed by Haydar Bammat, vis-à-vis closer cooperation between Armenian and Georgian nationalists in emigration, which was to lead later to the constitution of the Armenian-Georgian Union.

Insabato’s mistrust towards the Prometheans extends to the pact of the “ Caucasian Confederation”, signed in Brussels on July 14, 1934. He interpreted the “Promethean” agreement as being orchestrated by Poland with the significant assistance of the British Intelligence Service and pushed by the British oil circles. However, Insabato’s sympathy for the group Kavkaz caused his isolation in Rome because of the group’s ideals for Caucasian nationalism. Moreover, Bammat’s project to create the largest possible anti-Bolshevik front, including Great Britain alongside Italy, did not please Rome. Bammat’s appeal to Mussolini for an alliance between Italy and Caucasian nations was delivered by Insabato. The letter, which started with a briefing on the recent history of the Caucasus, talked about the possible uprisings in the USSR and the opportunities for the collapse of the Marxist regime. While questioning at this point which countries collaborate with Caucasians, he emphasized his worries about the ambiguity of the anti-Marxist regimes such as Italy, Germany, Japan, Turkey, and Spain. He stated that Italy’s interest in the Caucasian cause would be a very fortunate thing because Caucasian people needed an authoritarian power that suppress the clash of immature ideologies and avoid a chaotic political environment. Bammat had also stated that such an intervention would also be beneficial from the Italian point of view because the benevolent intervention of Italy in the resolution of the Caucasian problem could lead to the creation of very close ties of friendship between Russia and the Caucasus, from which would result both for Italy than for the Caucasus political, strategic or economic profits. After mentioning some facts and figures about the possible strategic or economic profits Bammat formulated how should the intervention manifest itself in twelve clauses. (See Bammats appeal from the links given below)

Though this attempt failed to redirect the real decision-makers in favor of the national-democratic current, it became an important milestone in the relations between Caucasian political immigration and the Fascist leader of Italy. In the autumn of 1935, the creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the stipulation of the Anti-Komintern Pact with Japan to which Italy adhered in 1937, made the new positions visible. Reciprocally, the nationalist wing of the Caucasian immigration sought more ideological affinity with their interlocutors, by multiplying the contacts between these and the internal organizations or close to the Nazi and Fascist parties. Bammat and his group did not compromise their political lines. They did not praise German Nazism, like groups affiliated with the Russian general Vlasov. The suspicion and distrust of the Germans towards Bammat and his group grew.

The Georgian Mensheviks sent a memorandum to the representatives of the German and Japanese Governments, especially the Italian Government in November 1937 to discredit Bammat and his group in the eyes of the Axis Powers. The memorandum which was coauthored by Noy Jordania, Akakiy Chkhenkeli, and Georges Gwazava was accusing Turkey of planning to annex the Caucasus. Enrico Insabato, who was against ruining relations with Ankara further, and wanted to avoid pushing Turkey into the arms of Britain, warned the Italian government that Georgian Mensheviks, in line with the British interests, has been inciting Italy and Turkey against each other. Insabato, strongly protested the memorandum in his articles published in several languages at the publications of Group Kavkaz. Bammat also in one of his editorials, pointed out that Ankara was pushed by the Allies into cooperation with the Bolsheviks in 1920. He emphasized that Italy did not fall into the same mistake by supporting the Caucasian cause at that time. Insabato's statements were a major blow to all Caucasian groups belonging to the Promethean movement in general. Because, in the same period, Warsaw asked Prometheans to restart intelligence activities in Turkey. Noy Jordania denied that he was one of those who penned the memorandum and claimed that the paper was written by an ordinary historian. The disclaimer signed and published by the Caucasus Confederation Council was stating the followings:

“We have received the following communique: the council of the caucasian confederation having learned of press information according to which an unfriendly note against Turkey has been delivered to the Italian, German, and Polish governments, declares categorically that such a note has never been addressed to the above-mentioned governments by the council nor by one of the sections being part of it (Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Caucasus).

The council seizes the opportunity to declare once again that friendly relations with Turkey were and are one of the bases on which it hopes to establish the independence and future well-being of the peoples of the Caucasus.”

At the beginning of 1937, Ukraine was destined to be firmly included in the Reich. Also, the Danube basin has been left to Germany. So, Rome turned its eyes more towards the south and to the Black Sea. To present itself as the most credible protector of the interests of foreigners, Italy, started to put a strong emphasis on its hostilities against the " imperial " power of the USSR not being limited to communism only. Italy considered the USSR as a modern avatar of “ tsarist Pan-Slavism ”, which would be a threat to Europe even without the Bolshevik ideology in power. Insabato constantly mentioned in his articles in Bammat’s periodical “Journal Kavkaz”, the North Caucasus as the region where Italian influence would be easiest to exert. On the eve of the great war his review, “Corriere diplomatico e con solare”, continued to support Haydar Bammat's group, and then all nationalist groups enjoyed Japanese or German aid, including detached nationalist elements. Insabato’s local rivals such as Carlo Enderle and Lauro Mainardi supported the Armeno-Georgian Union which was categorically Turcophobe. They were in contradiction with the plans of the German National Socialists and could not find any grounds in the Italian political circles. The profiles like Francesco Taddei, a young Italian Journalist from Mainardi group was more sophisticated. Taddei acted as an intermediary between Bammat and the governmental circles at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite all ideological and religious contradictions, Enrico Insabato seemed to be the sole consistent profile among the Italian political profiles. Although a great decision-maker, the son-in-law of Mussolini, Galeazzo Ciano, was rather anti-Turkish and close to the Armeno-Georgian Union, Bammat prevailed in the competition for Italian support due to German National Socialists' final preference.

Anyhow, we all know that the war ended up with an absolute defeat of the German National Socialists and its allies. Tens of thousands of Caucasian refugees strived to survive in refugee camps in Italy after many of them were handed over to the Soviets by the Allies at the end of the war. At that stage, all Italian political interlocutors of the Caucasians had disappeared except Enrico Insabato. Insabato, together with Bammat continued to support the Caucasian immigrants and refugees materially and spiritually even under very difficult conditions in the POW camps. Besides the huge sums of financial aid, they kept their hands always on these unfortunate people there until their life got normalized.

While recommending you the following works from our library for further reading on the topic, I am sharing the English translation of Insabato’s momentous article “Turkey, Italy, and The Caucasus” for the English-speaking audience.

Cem Kumuk

Click on the below links to access our library for further reading on the topic;

ITALY, TURKEY and CAUCASUS, By Enrico INSABATO

It is highly certain that the negotiations between Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, and Count Chiano will bring the Turkish-Italian friendship to the state it was in the first days of the fascist revolution and will bring about a collaboration between the two states that will give new and very positive results.

Lately, Turkey's eternal enemy (Panslavism) has benefited from the reluctance and coldness that undoubtedly stems from a misunderstanding.

Today, however, these times can be regarded as having finally ended. This broad collaboration is already on the horizon. Turkish energy has shown unchallenged success in the Hatay and Iskenderun issues.

Time will rather reinforce this success.

This will undoubtedly be followed by the issue of Turks and Kurds residing in Aleppo province.

This issue is also related to Mosul oil. And it will lead to many important political games among international interests. Therefore, the Turkish government is obliged to use its policy with restraint and prudence. However, there is another issue that makes Turkish-Italian unity essential in terms of its importance.

Italy, as a Mediterranean state, cannot neglect the economic and political importance of the Black Sea, which is in a large gulf of this sea. In the Middle Ages, it had economic and cultural influences on Ukraine, North Caucasus, Georgia, and Central Asian countries on the Black Sea coasts such as Venice and Genoa.

Italy's path to penetration into Asia is the path defined by Marko Polo. It is not the way through Iraq, Suez, and Singapore.

On the contrary, the presence of friendly and independent states such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Kuban and North Caucasus, and Georgia on the Black Sea coast is a great desire from the point of view of Italian interest.

Moreover, history has made Turkey the guardian of the straits connecting the Mediterranean and Black Seas. For this reason, Italy needs Turkey.

Because the key to the straits is in Turkey's hands. In this case, it is Italy's sole desire for Turkey to maintain its integrity and property and to become stronger politically and economically. Turkey should be sure that Italy will help her very much in this field.

For this reason, it is imperative to establish a sincere and continuous friendship and cooperation between Italy and Turkey, the Caucasus, and Ukraine, which complement each other in economic, industrial, mineral, and agricultural fields.

Because, from a general point of view, these countries constitute an economic cluster. The interests, duties, and rights of each of them govern the establishment of not only economic but also political unity between them.

In the future, Turkey needs to cooperate with the states in the Eastern part of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as much as Italy and perhaps rather, which will never be enemies at all. In this field, Italy must freely develop and settle its incontestable historical and spiritual needs. In fact, Iskenderun and Kurdistan are very important for Turkey's defense from the direction of the overland. However, the most important location in terms of Turkey's vitality is the Caucasus. Turkey can defend its glorious borders only if it leans on the Greater Caucasus range. Not from Ardahan and Igdir ...

Italy will support the independence of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, which are located between the Caucasus mountains and Turkey, for many reasons. For this reason, the need for an alliance between Italy and Turkey is essential for the purpose of securing external interests and for countering forces that threaten the welfare and well-being of governments on the Black Sea coast.

We hope that Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians, and especially some groups among those last two nations who attach importance to the propaganda against Turkey and Italy under the guise of anti-fascism, should know that the futurity and independence of their countries depend only on the Turkish-Italian agreement.

Because, if there is a force that will ensure the balance in the countries in the Eastern parts of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, justice in national affairs, and maintain peace, it is the Turkish-Italian agreement.

Cem KUMUK
Istanbul, 22 June 2023