Türkçe TercümeFriedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, a diplomat very familiar with Caucasian and Russian affairs, who was responsible for the establishment of a Georgian legion under the protectorate of the Central Powers during World War I, sent an invitation to the leaders of the Caucasian political emigration to hold talks in Berlin in April 1942, despite the fact that the Caucasian issue was within the scope of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. The invitees were accommodated in the famous Adlon Hotel in Berlin. For this reason, the process was called “Adloniade”. In the Adloniade process, several names of Caucasian political emigrants such as Haydar Bammat, Alihan Kantemir, Ahmet Nebi Magoma, Sultan Klych Girey, Mehmed Emin Resulzade, Halil-Bek Hasmehmedli, Mir Yaqoub, Said Shamil, Vladimir Akhmeteli, Dr. Mikeil Akhmeteli, Mikeil Kedia, Spiridon Kedia, Leo Kereselidze, Datha Vachnadze, Irakli Bagration and Zurab Avalishvili took part.
As soon as Haydar Bammat arrived in Berlin, he presented a note to Count Schulenburg on April 28, 1942, and determined the red lines for the negotiations to be held in Adlon for the North Caucasians:
The Isthmus of the Caucasus, which extends between two seas, outlets of the largest river arteries of Eastern Europe: the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, is connected by these two basins, on one side to the Mediterranean and Europe, on the other to Iran, Turkestan, Afghanistan and the entire Asian continent.
It is a bridge between the West and the East. It is a place of arms that radiates over the Mediterranean Middle East and Central Asia.
From the earliest times, all the historical vicissitudes of the Caucasus can be explained by its position on the world map. This geographical constant and the importance of the rich oil deposits of Bacou and Grozny for the war economy mark the role of the Caucasus in the current conflict and determine the place that must be reserved for it in the future organization of Europe and the Near East.
The Caucasus, between the Kuban and Kuma rivers in the north and the present borders of the UKSS in the south, is a well-defined economic unit. Transcaucasia lives on wheat from the North Caucasus. Batum is the natural port of Bacou.
Ethnic point of view, the division of the Caucasus into various regions independent of each other would encounter serious difficulties because the Caucasian peoples live in an inextricable tangle.
It is, therefore, logical that the Caucasus should be established as a federal state.
Four groups of peoples share the soil of the Caucasus: the peoples of the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, from the North-West to the East, the Armenians and Georgians, from the South and South-West.
Armenians and Georgians are Christians. The former are of the Armenian-Gregorian rite, the latter of the Greek Orthodox rite, like the Russians. A Georgian minority /the Adjars/ is Muslim.
The religious factor played a great role in the history of the Caucasus. It determined the divergent orientations of the Caucasian peoples. It was the direct cause of the settlement of Russia in Transcaucasia.
In 1783, Eastern Georgia requested and obtained the protectorate of coreligionist Russia. Pure and simple annexation followed in 1801.
The event was fatal for the free peoples of the North Caucasus. Georgia, having become the military base and auxiliary of Russia, these peoples were caught in the pincers of the Tsar's armies, which were advancing to the north across the great Russian plain and to the south, from his new Transcaucasian possessions. The fate of the Caucasian peoples was virtually settled.
The struggle, it is true, lasted for more than 60 years. The first half of the 19th century was filled with the resistance of Dagestan and Circassia to the greatest military empire of the time. But from then on, this struggle of extermination was hopeless. The defection of Georgia sealed the military crushing of the Caucasus.
The role of the Armenians in all the wars of Turkey and Persia, as zealous agents of Russian imperialism, is too well known. The Armenian attitude during the war of 1914-1918 has certainly not been forgotten in Germany...
Certainly, religious divisions have lost much of their dissolving force over time and no longer weigh on the relations of the peoples of the Caucasus among themselves. However, in the external relations of the Caucasus with its neighbors to the North and South, it is still necessary to take this factor into account. Indeed, although undermined by the revival of national sentiment and the spread of Marxist ideas, the religious subconscious continues to exercise a certain influence on the mentality of the Caucasian peoples.
First, religious affinities, then the penetration of Russian culture, followed by the development of the social-democratic movement, which had spread widely in Georgia since the last decade of the last century, created in Georgian public opinion a powerful current in favor of a united and indivisible Russia. The decentralist and pro-independence currents were, unfortunately, very weak.
This is how Georgia, dominated by the Social Democratic Party, created all obstacles to the separation of the Caucasus from Russia during the 1917 revolution. It finally accepted the idea of independence under pressure from Germany and Turkey.
The advent of Bolshevism has significantly strengthened the pro-Russian current because it is certain that of all the regions of the USSR, it is Georgia that is relatively better divided, thanks to Stalin... In all the cogs of the Soviet administration in the center and the multiple republics of the Union, the Georgians occupy the important posts.
Georgia's poisoning is, therefore, deep. Georgian patriots will have difficulty healing the wounds that a false and pernicious ideology and opportunistic spirit have brought to their Motherland. A long national cure is necessary. But with time and sincere cooperation with their Caucasian neighbors, Georgian patriots will certainly be able to overcome these difficulties.
The undoubted attachment of a large fraction of the Armenian people to Moscow is explained rather by aversion to Turkey than by any real sympathy for the Soviet regime.
Any Russian regime would have the votes of the considerable masses of Armenians. The clergy, the liberal democrats, the Socialist Revolutionary Party "Dashnaktsutyun" and the communists are united in this respect.
They all believe that their hopes for aggrandizement, at the expense of Turkey, can only be realized through Russian power.
There is, however, a young Armenian nationalist movement, which has understood the futility of the old grudges and the need for sincere collaboration with their Caucasian neighbors without ulterior motives or territorial claims exceeding the current borders of Armenia. A fraction of the " Dachnakzoutune " party, in a realistic spirit, seems to lean toward this conception...
The political and national aspirations of the peoples of the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan differ markedly from the picture I have just drawn. These peoples have nothing in common with the Russians either in race, language, or religion. No moral or ideological affinity binds them to Russia. They are subjected to the Bolshevik yoke, just as they were subjected to tsarist domination by the sole effect of violence. Their national consciousness and their Islamic culture set them irreconcilably against the Russians in general and the Bolshevik government in particular.
Even when the revolution of 1917 broke out, their attitude was clear and frank. Neither the North Caucasus nor Azerbaijan had any hesitation in seizing the opportunity that presented itself to detach themselves from Russia.
It was with weapons in hand and over several months that the peoples of the North Caucasus opposed the Russians of all colors: first the White Army of General Denikin, then the Red Army of the Soviets.
Both sides have attested to the fierce nature of this struggle. There is no shadow of doubt that, at present, the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan also constitute the healthiest, least contaminated parts of the USSR.
The peoples of these two regions, moreover, constitute the majority of the total population of the Caucasus. They occupy key economic and strategic positions there.
The two roads that cross the Caucasian chain, /the Georgian Military Highway and the Ossetian Military Highway/, as well as the two railway lines, which run along the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, are controlled by the peoples of the North Caucasus. In fact, over an area of approximately 900 kilometers, starting from the vicinity of Novorossiysk and up to the approaches to Bacou, both sides of the range are inhabited exclusively by these peoples.
The Muslim peoples of these two countries can be immediately drawn into military action against the Russians, and they will enthusiastically perform their military duty if the national and political reasons for such action are duly explained to them.
POLITICAL ASPECT
The problem of the Caucasian Federation vis-à-vis Russia cannot be considered in isolation from its geographical environment. The disproportion of forces between the united forces of the peoples of the Caucasus and the Russian multitudes is so great that the defense of the new state against its gigantic northern neighbor must be supported by a solid system of alliances.
By the nature of things and the development of the solidarity of the Slavic world, which is growing, Russia poses itself as the champion of Pan-Slavism against Germanism. The formidable mass of 230 million Slavs constitutes an equal danger for the Islamic-Turkish peoples, who extend from the Caucasus to the confines of the Great Yellow Asia.
In its defensive attitude against Russia, the Caucasus is therefore in solidarity, in the West, with Germany and its Western allies, and in the East with Turkey, Turkestan, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arab countries.
In the present conflict and the peaceful or armed struggles of the future, all these peoples can and must be allies of Germany. Nothing separates them from Germany. Vital interests draw them towards her. Germany enjoys immense political credit in the Muslim East, which believes in her political disinterestedness in these parts and sees in her the determined adversary of their Russian and English oppressors.
This is a moral capital of inestimable value, which can and, we believe, must be exploited as best as possible in mutual interest and above all in the interest of the heroic German army, which is at present sustaining the most gigantic struggle that history has ever known. The urgent task that is imposed is to create immediately the best conditions for a fruitful and lasting collaboration between these peoples and the German Government.
The German army is on the border of the Islamic-Turkish space. The Muslim peoples of the Euro-Asian continent, as well as the Arabs of the Mediterranean region, are anxiously awaiting an unequivocal statement from the German Government, which would tell them that the armies of the Third Reich bring them independence and freedom.
It would be disloyal of me to conceal the fact that there is currently a certain unease over this issue. Anglo-Russian propaganda is taking advantage of this skillfully. This propaganda makes the position of Germany's convinced friends quite delicate. The struggle against communism, despite its sacred character from the point of view of human civilization, is not a definitive goal for our people. It is a step, it is true, a gigantic and ardently desired step, towards the supreme goal: independence.
I consider, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance that the German Government should make public, as quickly as possible, its intentions regarding the Caucasus and the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire.
The solemn recognition of the independence of the Caucasus, loudly proclaimed and widely disseminated, will have an immense repercussion throughout the Muslim East. It will enable us, Caucasian patriots, to instill in our populations national enthusiasm and to ask them for sacrifices and unlimited assistance from the German army.
As for future relations between Germany and the Caucasus, I believe that the best form would be a close state-to-state alliance.
All Caucasians are perfectly aware that the security of their country vis-à-vis Russia, or any other conceivable Slavic formations, cannot be ensured without the guarantee and military support of Germany. It is, therefore, natural that all the human and material resources of the Caucasus must be united with those of Germany. It is a question of adequate military and economic conventions...
For the independence of the peoples of the Caucasus to be based on solid foundations, it is still necessary to clarify the position of the Caucasus towards Turkey, its southern neighbor.
Territorial frictions, based on more or less distant historical memories, have created a certain unease in Turkish-Georgian and, above all, Armenian-Turkish relations. These relations must be clarified clearly and definitively.
Based on the existing faits accomplis and taking into account the importance of Turkey's benevolent attitude towards the new Caucasian state and its role in the anti-Slavic complex, Armenians and Georgians must renounce all territorial claims and sincerely and loyally seek the establishment of friendly relations with their neighbor.
The creation of a solidly organized buffer state between her and Russia is of obvious interest to Turkey. It is to be hoped with reason that the Turkish Government will not oppose it in any way. On one condition, however, that the new state will never become a place of arms for a policy hostile to Turkey.
Sufficient proof of the willingness of the peoples of the Caucasus to leave no room for future interference of Russian influence in Caucasian affairs must be provided.
On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the Armenian-Georgian distrust of Turkey's imperialist intentions. The Armenian-Georgian public opinion must be reassured.
The satisfaction to be given to Turkey should be sought in the internal structure of the Caucasian state.
Armenian-Georgian concerns could be calmed by the guarantee of the Caucasus borders, agreed jointly by Germany and Turkey.
A limited period of military occupation must be provided, during which all national organizations in the Caucasus will devote their activity to the organization of their country in close cooperation with the German authorities.
If the ideas set out above were to find approval with the German Government, a central political body, similar to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, established during the previous war in Paris - Pichon Declaration of 24/1918, and the agreement of 28 September 1918 - could be created.
This body should be constituted taking into account the general considerations set out above and the military and political aims that it is called upon to fulfill during the hostilities and at the time of the occupation of the Caucasian territories.
Given the multiplicity of political formations and divergent currents in the Caucasian emigration, the formation of the National Council and its effective leadership must be entrusted to a leading Caucasian politician, who, through his past, guarantees loyalty to Caucasian independence and is endowed with a strong personality, capable of imposing himself on his compatriots.
All four national groups of the Caucasus must be fairly represented in the National Council by their most qualified nationals.
It was clear that Bammat had taken a very firm stance during the Adlon negotiations, which was not welcomed by the Nazi leadership, particularly Alfred Rosenberg. Haydar Bammat insisted that the precondition for the Caucasians' alliance with the German Reich was for the Germans to immediately declare that they recognized the independence of the Caucasus. He was extremely disturbed by the German stance on this issue at the meeting and whispered into the ear of Georgian politician Spridon Kedia, whom he met in the corridors of the Hotel Adlon and said, “I am surprised by the silence of our Caucasian friends. Why don't they express their desire for Caucasian independence more forcefully to the Germans? We must clearly demand from the Germans the recognition of the independence of the Caucasus... Otherwise, we cannot cooperate with them.” Rosenberg, who had been distant from the Adlon event organized by Count Schulenburg from the very beginning, considered Bammat's behavior disloyal.
In his speech at the Hotel Adlon, Bammat emphasized that in the future, the Caucasian federation should play the role of a bridge between the West [Germany] and the East [Japan] and implement a policy of balance between these powers. This understanding completely contradicted the plans of the Reich leaders who wanted to establish a Reich Commissariat in the Caucasus. According to Professor Gerhard von Mende, a leading figure in the Eastern Ministry, Bammat’s statement almost caused the Germans to break up the meeting and send the delegates home. Rosenberg, offended by Bammat's “ingratitude” in his own assessment, derogatorily labeled Bammat a “spy”. Bammat was deeply disappointed by the Caucasus policy he understood the Reich would pursue and left Berlin for Switzerland.
Before leaving Berlin, Bammat left a letter of thanks for his efforts to Count Schulenburg on June 8:
You have kindly honored me by inviting me to come to Berlin to ask my opinion on the problem of the Caucasus.
In a note addressed to Your Excellency dated April 28 last, and in subsequent conversations, I have frankly explained to you everything I think on this subject.
After spending a month and a half in Berlin and having become acquainted with ideas that are current in various German circles, I consider it my duty to reiterate to you once more before my departure my absolute conviction that only an immediate and highly proclaimed recognition of the principle of the independence of the Caucasus can assure the German armies a friendly welcome and unreserved collaboration from our peoples.
This is also the only basis that can guarantee the cordiality of future relations between Germany and the Caucasus.
You have been able, Excellency, to assure yourself that for several years, I had taken with my political friends, united in the movement "Der Kaukasus", a clearly defined position alongside Germany.
It was in anticipation of an inevitable clash between Slavism, represented by Russia, and Germanism, to which the geopolitical position and vital interests have linked the Caucasus in an indissoluble way, that I had entered into contact with certain political circles in Germany.
Encouraged by the friendly reception that was reserved for my ideas, I advocated by word and in writing a policy of confident collaboration with Germany.
The time has come for me and my friends to match words with action. The war that Germany is waging against Communist Russia is entering a phase in which it must become, for us Caucasian patriots, a national war for the independence of our Fatherland.
We believe that our place now is alongside those of our compatriots who will actually fight on the battlefields for the national cause.
Therefore I have the honor to request in my own name and in the name of a certain number of my immediate collaborators, who are currently lending their support to the practical work being done in various Ministries, the favor of henceforth serving the cause of the independence of the Caucasus with arms in hand in the ranks of our legions.
I beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good enough to transmit my present request to the Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht. As soon as I have a favorable response, the list of my friends who asked to be engaged will be presented to you by my replacement in Berlin, Mr. Alikhan Kantemir, and I will come immediately myself to place myself at the disposal of the military authorities.
Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Bammat's condition that the independence of the Caucasus must be immediately and publicly recognized in order for the German armies to be welcomed in the Caucasus was extremely contradictory to the German National-Socialists, who at the time were certain that they would wipe the USSR off the map in a few months. Although they accepted this idea in the later stages of the war, insistently voicing it in June 1942 did nothing but provoke racist minds and caused Bammat to break all ties with the German administration.
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 10 March 2025