Türkçe TercümeThis week in the Historical Memory of the North Caucasus, I will share over 1,600 genuine archival documents from the German Federal Archives, most of which have never been published before, about North Caucasians who were forced to ‘volunteer’ in different units of the armed forces of Nazi Germany during World War II. In addition, in the coming days, I will also share British National Archive documents on the forced repatriation of prisoners of war to the Soviets and documents related to the Caucasus and Caucasians in the interrogations of senior German officials after the war. In the first place, the over 1,600 documents, classified by year in 7 folders, which I am sharing today, are sources that I attach great importance in terms of revealing Nazi Germany's perspective on the Caucasus and Caucasians from the beginning to the end of the war in a striking way.
I regret that I will not be able to find the time to do a detailed study on the role of North Caucasians in World War II due to the priority archival compilation work I am currently undertaking. I hope these documents I am sharing will serve as a resource for researchers who wish to study the subject in depth. Since the documents originate from many different archival centers, funds, and files, it will not be possible to provide the archival registry details here. Researchers who wish to refer to these documents in their studies can cite them in their bibliography as ‘Cem Kumuk, North Caucasus Historical Memory, German Federal Archive Document Compilations’ (e-source).
Link to the search results for the relevant archival folders:
https://www.historycaucasus.com/archives?keyword=Military+Formations+of+The+German+Reich&category=1&author=&publisher=&year%5Bmin%5D=&year%5Bmax%5D=
You can also click on the image below to access the search results:
On 31 July 1942, Radio Paris broadcast an order issued by the military command of Vichy France that refugees of Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, or North Caucasian nationality should report to the Caucasian Immigration Office in Paris. At this office, which operated under the supervision of Gestapo officials, Caucasians were given new identity cards and asked to be ready for orders from the Caucasian Immigration Office. Anyone who failed to register would be subjected to the same regulations as Soviet citizens and would be interned. After the Bolshevik revolution, a significant number of North Caucasian emigrants immigrated to Europe and ended up in France, where they were forced to register with these offices and join the legions at the beginning of WW2.
Germany's Eastern policy was shaped by the rivalry between Schulenburg, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, and Erich Koch. In April 1942, Schulenburg sent invitations to several refugee leaders from France, Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, and Switzerland to meet in Berlin. By the end of April and the beginning of May, most of the invitees arrived in Berlin and were accommodated in the famous Adlon Hotel. The process was therefore dubbed the ‘Adloniade’. Schulenburg's list included names such as Haydar Bammat, Alihan Kantemir, Mehmed Emin Resulzade, Said Shamil, Spiridon Kedia, Leo Kereselidze, Datha Vachnadze, Irakli Bagration and Zurab Avalishvili.
After responsibility was transferred to the Ministry for the East, the talks continued with the support of technocrats such as Professor Gerhard von Mende. What was discussed at the talks at the Adlon Hotel has not been systematically recorded, but the published memoirs of the participants and the letters they wrote to their relatives during their days in Berlin give us a good idea of what was discussed there.
Shortly after the meetings started, Haydar Bammat decided to break negotiations with the Germans. Bammat probably took this decision in order not to take a hit in the career dispute between the Germans themselves, as he soon realized the disagreements between Schulenburg and the Eastern Ministry. Besides, the fact that Rosenberg was more respected on Hitler's side than Schulenburg and that Rosenberg regarded Bammat as an intelligence agent suggests that Bammat may not have wanted the Caucasus cause to be damaged by a possible personal rivalry.
Although Adloniade did not produce the desired results, it was still an important step for the Caucasus. In practice, the transfer of issues concerning the peoples of the East from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of the East proved not to be as dangerous for the Caucasian cause as had been feared. For they would not have to deal with Schickedanz, but with Brautigam and Mende. Brautigam was in close contact with Schulenburg. Mende, on the other hand, was like the protector of all non-Russian immigrants in the Reich. Mende, who knew the mindset of the committees very well, said that what motivated the committees was not only hatred of the Bolshevik system but also the desire to throw off the Russian yoke altogether.
Rosenberg thought that the political representation of the peoples of these lands, which were to be made a German colony, would be a privilege that would cause problems later on, and he did not want to recognize such a privilege from the beginning. However, in the second half of 1942, this became a necessity for the Germans, and with the encouragement of Professor Gerhard von Mende, the formation of National Committees of non-Russian Soviet peoples began. Rosenberg was deeply offended by the expressions in the propaganda texts that blatantly promised freedom to the Caucasians. Despite all the censorship, Berlin, which in September 1942 decided to establish local governments under German control in the region, was forced to allow the use of phrases such as ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’. The racist German commanders were not happy about this. The statements of General Heinz Hellmich, Commander of the Eastern Forces, made clear the German view of the legions: ‘Let them sacrifice their blood for us, that's the best thing they can be good for!’
On 5 October 1943, the conference of NSDAP officially recognized the National Committees. Initially, the committee consisted only of political emigrants who had left their homeland after the Bolshevik revolution, but in the following stages, it was transformed into a committee in which Soviet citizens of North Caucasus also took part. The committee was chaired by Ahmed Nebi Magoma and Alikhan Kantemir was its spokesman. Kantemir was also the responsible director of the committee's Russian-language publication ‘North Caucasus’ (Severny Kavkaz). The committee also published newspapers, ‘Mountain Eagle’ (Gornıy Orel), and ‘Holy War’ (Gazavat), both in Russian and in the languages of the peoples of the Caucasus, to be distributed in the military units where North Caucasian volunteers fought. The North Caucasus National Committee had certain disadvantages compared to other committees of the Eastern peoples. The homogeneous ethnic structure of the other committees was at first glance seen as a great advantage for a more disciplined organization. However, the worries were in vain. The activities of the National Committee of the North Caucasus were less interrupted than the others. The North Caucasians used the National Committee only when they had an issue to resolve with the Germans. Other than that, each ethnic group tried to resolve their issues in the commissions they established for themselves without escalating them to higher levels. The Caucasus State Commissariat of the Germans planned to establish, aimed at the economic exploitation of Caucasian oil resources and mines. The National Committee and the soldiers in the legions were also aware of this fact. The following questions were frequently asked in the polls conducted among the Caucasian legionnaires: ‘Will we become a German colony?’, ‘What will be the share of the Caucasian peoples in the economic administration?’, ‘Will the administration of the Caucasus be like the German administration in Poland and Ukraine?’, ‘Will Germany bring back the big landowners and refugees of the Tsarist period and give them the administration?’ Most of the legionnaires and committee members were extremely distant and wary of National Socialism and German rule.
On 21 November 1941, the Wehrmacht captured Rostov, the gateway to the Caucasus. From the end of 1941, the ‘Bergmann Battalion’ began to be formed and sent to the Caucasus in mid-1942. Before the Bergmann Battalion arrived in the Caucasus, a unit of about 150 North Caucasians, formed in October 1941 as the North Caucasus Special Commandos, was trained for ten months in all underground activities for an operation called ‘Shamil’. The first group of 30 men, armed with fake documents, explosives, and weapons, was parachuted into the vicinity of Maykop with the task of blowing up bridges and railways while preventing the Soviets from blowing up oil installations to prevent them from falling into German hands. The Maykop operation resulted in the capture of the city by German 5th Army units on 9 August 1942 by Brandenburg commandos wearing Red Army uniforms. The Bergmann Battalion also set out from Mittenwald on 29 July 1942, reaching Rostov on 17 August, then Pyatigorsk via Armavir on 25 August.
The number of Caucasians in the POW camps who defected and joined the Germans increased to such an extent that by 7 September 1942 seven more companies had been added to Bergmann. The population of the battalion increased from 1,200 to 2,800 men. Two important factors were motivating those in prison camps to join the German legions. The first was that they considered this as an opportunity to save their homeland from Stalin's tyranny rather than to die in disgrace in German prison camps. The other was that they knew very well that even if they survived the war, the NKVD would not leave them alive because they were captured by the Germans. As a matter of fact, examples of this were to be seen in the later stages of the war. In addition to the five companies, the Bergmann Battalion was divided into more than ten small mobile teams the size of platoons. These teams carried on their reconnaissance, sabotage, and propaganda activities behind Soviet lines.
By late 1942 it became obvious to the German command that the war was being lost. The fate of the Eastern Front was sealed at Stalingrad. Not only did the Germans exhaust all their resources there, but they were also caught unprepared by the winter conditions. It became more important than ever for the Germans to find more North Caucasian volunteers to fight in their ranks. If an uprising could be started behind Red Army lines, it would be possible to break out of the Red Army siege. Operations behind Soviet lines were therefore stepped up, and from September 1942 Dr. Oberlander was trying to recruit more Caucasian volunteers for the Bergmann battalion. In October 1942, with the appointment of Ralph von Heygendorff as Commander of the Eastern Legions, the recruitment of Caucasian volunteers gained acceleration. By April 1943, the Bergmann Battalion had grown to the size of a regiment.
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The news that the Soviets started mass executions in the areas they captured led the legionnaires to involve their families in the retreat, fearing that the same thing would happen to their families. Different sources give very close figures for the number of North Caucasians who joined the retreat with the Germans. Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that this number was around 8,000. If we also take into account the information that the number of volunteers registered in Bergmann's Regiment reached around 2,800 people at its peak, we can assume that over 5,000 people who joined the retreat with the Germans were elderly, women, and children civilians. As a matter of fact, we will see later on that information from different sources regarding the changes in the composition of this refugee group confirms this assumption.
The evacuation of the 17th Army, of which Bergmann was a part, from Crimea began on 27 March 1944. Having completed their front-line duties in Crimea, all of Bergmann's units crossed into Romania in early April. The Germans detained trains carrying Legion personnel and their families in Romania, prioritizing the transport of German soldiers. The personnel of these units scattered around with their families to avoid being caught by the Red Army troops coming from the rear. After some time some of the groups arrived in Greece via Bulgaria on trains provided by the Germans. Arriving in Greece in mid-May, the troops were stationed in Eleusis and Thebes, near Athens sometime, and protected the Megara airbase and the Athens-Peloponnesian railway line. They remained in Greece for about 5 months, suffering serious casualties in clashes with Greek communist partisans. On 25 October 1944, the North Caucasian personnel of the Regiment crossed into Serbian territory through Macedonia. In November 1944, the Regiment withdrew to the Serbian-Bosniak line to defend the rear of the German Army and was forced to engage in hand-to-hand combat with rapidly advancing Soviet and Bulgarian troops in the Rasvi region of Serbia. It was during this period that the North Caucasians suffered the most casualties. The North Caucasian Legion spent the period December 1944 - January 1945 in Sarajevo and participated in anti-partisan operations on the Bosnian - Croatian line. Since the Yugoslav partisans executed those they captured immediately, the besieged personnel of the legion preferred to fight to the death rather than be captured.
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In late 1944, the Caucasian Liberation Army, or ‘Kaukasischer-Waffen-Verband der SS’ as the Germans officially called it, was formed under the supervision of an SS colonel (standardenführer) named Arved Theuermann. The unit was commanded by Colonel Kushuk Kaspoletovich Ulagay. With the formation of the Caucasian Liberation Army, prominent figures of the North Caucasian political emigration, such as Said Emin Tukayev (Daydash), roamed around POW camps to find volunteers to enlist in the army. The news that the Germans were losing the war reached the prison camps already in the summer of 1944, and the prisoners were reluctant to be enrolled. Despite great efforts, goals were not reached in the enrolment of new volunteers.
On 12 February 1945, the 13th and 14th Cavalry battalions of the Bergmann Regiment in Yugoslavia and the Regimental headquarters were disbanded. The 3rd North Caucasian Infantry Battalion was in northern Slovenia in April. General Sultan Sultan Klych Girey representing the North Caucasian National Committee and Colonel Kushuk Ulagay, decided immediate withdrawal of the Caucasians of the Bergmann Regiment, who were trapped in Yugoslav territory, to northern Italy. After establishing safe camps for the remnants of the Regiment and their families, Klych Girey and Ulagay took up defensive positions against attacks by Italian Communist guerrillas.
In late January 1945, when the Anglo-American air raids on Berlin became intolerable, the members of the Caucasian National Committee and the North Caucasian Military Council also left Berlin and moved to Paluzza in Italy.
Nazi Germany was on the verge of defeat and the end of the war was only a matter of days away. The North Caucasian refugees in Upper Friuli and Carnia had no worries, knowing that their area was in the Allied sphere of influence and that the Red Army would not be able to cross the Slovene border separating the two regions, even at close range. They were looking forward to surrendering to the representatives of the British or American armies and waking up from the nightmare that had lasted for years. The only thing that disturbed the refugees was the harassment of the communist Italian partisans. However, the Italian partisans were also cautious from the beginning and did not attempt a large-scale attack on the Caucasian-Cossack region, but demanded that the refugees leave Italy and cross into Austria. General Sultan Sultan Klych Girey, who was in charge of about 5,000 North Caucasian refugees, did not bother with the idea of crossing into Austria, which he considered to be in the British sphere of influence. The refugee convoy included many elderly men, women, and children. The North Caucasian refugees left Italy on 28 April to cover the 60 kilometers from Paluzza to Oberdrauburg. The march to Austria was a journey full of troubles and dangers. In the early stages of the journey, they had to fend off attacks by Italian partisans. First, the convoy was targeted by partisan bullets and then suffered serious losses on the steep and snow-covered roads. Amid a violent storm, the refugees crossed the Austrian border. Late in the evening of 3 May, the first group reached Kötschach-Mauthen, the first Austrian settlement.
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For two years after the end of the war, a large number of North Caucasian refugees who were captured by the Allies in different parts of Europe were held in camps in Western Europe for a while and handed over to the Soviets after being interrogated. The majority of those released lived for some time in poor conditions in Italy for fear of being handed over to the Soviets and were then sent by ships to Turkey and Jordan. A significant number of these refugees emigrated to the United States in the following years and took part in anti-communist intelligence work during the Cold War.
Source:
Kumuk C., Düvel-i Muazzama'nın Kıskacında Kafkasya Dağlıları (In Turkish), Selenge Yay. Istanbul 2022, pp. 683-721
Kumuk C., Bir Hanzadenin Kafkasya’dan Moskova’daki Darağacına Uzanan Trajik Yaşam Öyküsü, GENERAL SULTAN KILIÇ GİREY (In Turkish), Kafkas Vakfı Yay., Istanbul, 2023, pp. 144-251
Cem Kumuk
Istanbul, 7 December 2024