Alikhan Kantemir, who had gone to Switzerland with Haydar Bammat returned to the Caucasus instead of joining the delegation in Paris due to the environment created by the Russian Civil War in the Caucasus. He was in Tbilisi on May 23rd to represent the Republic of The North Caucasus at the conference between the Caucasian Republics. Kantemir's letter to Haydar Bammat was quite remarkable from the point of his perception of events in those days in the North Caucasus. The perceptions and reactions of the Transcaucasian participants of the conference to the invasion of the North Caucasus by the Volunteer Army were equally interesting. Just as in the 19th century, Transcaucasian politicians were again incapable of realizing that the invasion of the North was their doom, and they could not free themselves from the vicious border disputes. Today, more than a century later, nothing has changed much. Communities and nations that do not learn from their history are doomed to experience similar troubles forever.Cem Kumuk, Istanbul, 10 August 2024
Türkçe Tercüme
Tbilisi, May 23, 1919
No.23
Mr. Chairman, Delegation of the Government of the Republic of the North Caucasus to the Peace Conference in Paris.
On the instructions of the Chairman of the Government, I sent a message from Mr. Arno with documents and a detailed account of the course of events in the Caucasus and the activities of our Government. At that time, I informed you, among other things, about the war that had broken out between our Government and Denikin's army on the grounds of the latter's non-recognition of our independence and our union as a single political organism. The battles that had taken place in Chechnya and Ingushetia had greatly shaken the fighting strength of the volunteer army, and General Denikin, at the suggestion of the allied command, was forced to enter into peace negotiations with us, which took place in Grozny on April 2. At the Grozny Conference, our party was attended by [Rashid Khan] Kaplan[ov], Zubeyr Temirkhan[ov], Nazhmudin Gotsinsky, and Denikin himself, and the allied command was represented by General Briggs and Colonel Rowlandson.
At the Conference, General Denikin categorically stated that he still did not recognize the Mountaineers’ Union and its Government. Our delegates, having spent only two hours at the Conference, left Grozny and returned through Chechnya. The Chechen people greeted the Delegation with enthusiastic applause and at numerous meetings passed a resolution to continue the war of independence. The Chairman of the Government [Pshemakho] Kotse[v] also went to Chechnya shortly afterward, whom the people greeted as the first elected one, giving him royal honors and exclaiming: Long live our union, our President. After that, seeing such a firm mood of the masses, the Government decided to continue the war with Denikin, and I sent a note to all the Governments and Representatives of the Allied Command to continue the war, which has not stopped to this day. There are uprisings in Kabarda, Balkaria, and Digoria, not to mention Ingushetia and Chechnya, which, hold the government front. Sheikhs Uzun Hajji, Ali Hajji and others unanimously united and promised the Government all support as long as it stood on the ground of waging a war of independence. This war has contributed more to uniting the union and strengthening the Government’s prestige. The Kotse[v] cabinet, which was unable to clothe in coherent forms the active popular will and indignation against Denikin, was forced to resign and the formation of a new cabinet was entrusted by Parliament to General [Mikhail] Khalil[ov], who still has not announced the composition of the Government. We understand the political situation at present in such a way that we consider it inadmissible to deviate either towards Bolshevism or to the right. Our ideal is the creation of a Mountain democratic system, if a person is found who can implement these principles in the leadership of the Government, we will be saved. I don't know whether General Khalil[ov] will be able to cope with this task. I have already telegraphed you that the Russian Bolsheviks and some of their own, Korkmasov, Khizroev, and others have propagandized the two villages of Kazanishe and Turkumkale and had a plot to overthrow the Government and declare the Highlanders part of Soviet Russia. They were arrested with documents that compromised them to a great extent the remaining leaders raised the said two villages and made an attempt to advance on Temir-Khan-Shura. The rebels were met by Government troops. There was a small battle, several of the advancing troops were wounded and killed, and our troops had two wounded. Khalil[ov] reports that full order has been restored in the country.
We have come to Tiflis for the Conference of Caucasian Republics, where we have been working for about three weeks and will probably stay for another three weeks. Besides me, Muradin Penzulaev and Aslan-Bek Butaev are in the delegation.
The Conference has put in the order of the day many questions on which our further existence depends.
Seven Commissions were organized on the issues of 1) Territorial, 2) Political, 3) Railway, postal, and telegraph, 4) Financial and economic, 5) Refugees, and 6) Regular immigration. The Financial Commission recognized the need to create a single currency for all Caucasian Republics. Until that time we will have to be content in this regard with loans from Azerbaijan and the issue of Transcaucasian bonds by Georgia and Armenia if this happens. Azerbaijan stopped participating in this issue and issued its own bonds.
In the group of political issues the following agenda is to be considered:
- On the mutual recognition of each other's independence and the promulgation of a solemn act on behalf of the Caucasian Republics,
- On the solidarity of all the Caucasian States at a congress of the world wherever necessary in the name of defending the independence of the Caucasus,
- On the adoption of preventive measures for the defense of the Caucasian Republics from external encroachments,
- On measures for the joint struggle of the Caucasian Republics against the Volunteer Army,
- On the establishment of an all-Caucasian international body, which would unite the main lines of foreign and domestic policy of the four Republics.
This is the work of the Conference so far. I forgot to add that Kaplan[ov] also left the Government. [Vassan Girey] Dzhabagi[ev] has taken over the chairmanship of the Parliament, and Kaplan[ov] has withdrawn from all affairs because of his peculiar inclination to the left.
The situation in Chechnya, which at the moment constitutes our main force at the front, is extremely alarming and vague. General Aliyev, after no agreement was reached at the Grozny Conference between our Government and Denikin, assumed the role of the savior of the mountain peoples, declaring the figures of the Mountain Union to be deluded fantasists and negotiated on behalf of the Chechen people with Denikin, in whose headquarters he had been staying until now. With several Chechens, randomly picked up at the market, including Ibragim Chulikov, he agreed with Denikin, according to which Chechnya would be self-governing as a separate unit, under the supremacy of Russia. Denikin managed to conclude exactly the same kind of agreements with the same reactionary figures in Ingushetia - General Malsagov, Ossetia - Colonel Beta Khabayev, and Kabarda - Bekovich Cherkassky Tembot. We telegraphed to you that Tapa should come, we repeat that his arrival will bring great clarification to the atmosphere of Chechnya, and therefore Tapa's arrival is necessary.
We place great hopes on our Delegation in Paris in the sense of implementing our independence, which the Caucasian peoples will stand on an equal footing with others until the last opportunity. We do not share the Constantinople sentiments and views of our Delegation to the north, the position of Georgia in Constantinople seems more correct to us.
We may be forced to adopt forms of political life that alienate us from the platform of independence and the Caucasian Federation. In practice, you must fulfill the task of withdrawing Denikin's troops from our territory, at least beyond Mineralnye Vody. We have decided here to maintain our claims with Denikin to this extent.
We are waiting for letters and pleasant messages from you. We wish you success in your work.
Chairperson, A. Kantemir
Secretary, А. Gorbokov
(Click on the image for a larger view)
May 29, 1919.
Present: N. V. Ramishvili /Georgia/. M. Yu. Jafarov. F.H. Khoysky, H.B. Khas-Mamedov /Azerbaijan/. S.F. Tigranyan. S.S. Harutyunyan. S.G. Mamininyan /Armenia/. A.H. Kantemir. Butaev and Penzulaev /Mount. Rep./.
S.F. Tigranyan presides.
* Ramishvili: I propose to listen to the minutes of the meeting of the representatives of the Georgian Government with the representative of the Volunteer Army Command, General Briggs. (The minutes of the meeting on May 23rd are being read out)
* Ramishvili: Here is everything that was said at the meeting on May 23. The next day Gen. Beach had a conversation with the Chairman of our Government. In this conversation Gen. Beach tried to soften the statements of Gen. Briggs, confirming, however, that Denikin would attack since he had not reached an agreement with Georgia. I must state that, for our part, the necessary preparations for defense have already been made, so it is clear that the question is not only about border disputes. Simultaneously with the operations in the Sochi direction, Denikin was conducting an offensive against the Mountaineers. It is clear that since the Paris Conference is dealing with the Russian question, Denikin wants to put the Paris Conference before the accomplished fact by seizing the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.
* Kantemir: Let me clarify the occupation of the Mountaineers’ Republic by the Volunteer Army. As soon as the Allied Command appeared in Baku, they offered to establish communication with Denikin. Your desire to fight the Bolsheviks, they said, would help Denikin in his fight against them. We said that as long as it concerns the Bolsheviks, we will fight. If you are interested in this agreement I can read it. (Reads paragraphs of the agreement). Further circumstances showed that things did not work out that way. Denikin has advanced to Mineralnye Vody to advance into the North Caucasus. At that time we occupied Vladicaucase. It happened a day earlier than the Bolsheviks occupied it. During the period of hostilities, we appealed to the British Command, and they assured us that Denikin was going against the Bolsheviks, and was going to destroy this contagion. We were not very sophisticated in diplomacy and believed what they told us. We could not imagine that there were so many untruths around such authorities. At this time Denikin approached Grozny, when he declared that he did not recognize the Mountaineers’ Government: "I represent a united Russia and I cannot make any promises before the Constituent Assembly," he said. We declared that we could not tolerate such a situation and would oppose it in every possible way. Then he began to lead an offensive into the center of Chechnya. Our government was winning over the population. But when it became clear that Denikin's offensive was clearly directed against us / until then it was considered under the banner of fighting the Bolsheviks, it moved to a defensive position and issued the following statement (reads). In response to this, we received a note from the British Command (reads). After the note was handed over, I talked with them and stated that we were only on the defensive. Not long after, General Milne arrived and we had a conversation with him on the matter. Milne put all this in front of Denikin and suggested that the latter should come to Grozny with Gen. Briggs, where a conference was held, with the participation of representatives of the Mountaineers’ Republic. Denikin did not change anything in his demands, he said that we would have broad autonomy, regional self-government, etc. Briggs made a surprised gesture and asked what else we wanted. We did not accept these proposals. Then the Allied Command and Denikin took other paths. They summoned the reactionary General Aliyev and offered him to go to the people. This was in Grozny. Aliyev said a few words in Chechen and thus they played a separatist agreement with the people and established a "modus vivendi". As a result, we received a paper from the Allied Command. Thus on the one hand we got a guarantee that they would not attack, and on the other hand our question would be solved finally only at the Peace Conference, but we still did not come to any agreement. By the way, Denikin lost about 5000 men fighting with us.
This whole war has terribly exhausted and weakened the strength of the government. Although our Government had never been so popular and had never enjoyed such support, at this very time there came a governmental crookedness. Within the generalship and the officer corps, was discovered a shift to the side of Denikin. The most important thing is that we could not put up with this situation for economic reasons; the people saw that the victory of Denikin was eternal bondage, and eternal slavery, which explains the desperate enmity. The people saw the cracks and all reactionary elements began to play on it, which put forward General [Mikhail] Khalil[ov], but he could not form a cabinet, because no one joined him, and at that time Denikin launched an offensive from Gudermes and soon, namely on the 21st was in Petrovsk. The head of the Mountaineers’ Government learned about it only on the 22nd. All this was because some circles, to whom Denikin was favorable, did not resist and definitely declared that they would not fight anymore. Parliamentary circles declared that it was no longer possible to fight any further. As a result, the Parliament temporarily dissolved itself and interrupted sessions because the enemy's army had occupied the country. Denikin declared that he did not recognize the Mountaineers’ Government, and as for Dagestan he was given to organize the power, and that he would not embroil himself in it, and appointed his General-Governor [Aratskhan] Haji-Murat. At present Denikin has occupied such places that we are cut off completely. I have received a telegram from [Pshemakho] Kotse[v], in which he informs us that we are asked to remain in place and continue our work. This gives us reason to think that the old Government is organizing something there. We would like the Caucasian Conference to speak out on this subject and to declare its attitude towards the Volunteer Army. We have the impression that you are in danger from the side of Denikin. It is clear to us that you must speak out definitely about your attitude toward Denikin, and if you actively oppose the Volunteer Army, I can assure you that among the Mountaineers you will find still enough inflammable material to take part in this struggle, as for the Volunteer Army.
* Ramishvili: Yesterday we received news from our Representative to Azerbaijan that Azerbaijani units are already leaving for Samur. Denikin's troops are in Derbent.
* Kantemir: I forgot to report that our news coincided with the departure of Colonel Gabba to Paris, who promised to arrange a lot of things there and said that these events partly caused his departure. I handed him a protest for the Peace Conference.
* Harutyunyan: We are not prepared for today's meeting. Alikhan will definitely put the question. It is desirable to listen to the opinions of each delegation separately. Each delegation may find it necessary to communicate with its Government.
* Ramishvili: I think that there are things that are clear in themselves. therefore it is necessary to exchange opinions now, and we can decide tomorrow.
* Tigranian: The proposal on active statements should be clarified. Whether the Armenian troops should go to Baku or it is a question of diplomatic decisions.
* Ramishvili: I will convey the opinion of my Government. The general situation is as follows: At the Paris Conference the Russian question is raised, and the Russian dignitaries gathered there want to put the Conference before the fact of incorporating Transcaucasia into Russia. Therefore, although they have an important task in the North, nevertheless they go to the South. They know that the Bolsheviks will perish anyway and that the peripheries can secede, and this explains Denikin's movement. As for the British and, in general, the Allies, according to information from Paris, the general situation is uncertain. They are trying to figure out how to solve this great Russian question. The meeting on the Princess Islands has been disrupted. The sending of the Army to Russia has failed. Now according to Briggs, it is evident that they want to rebuild Russia by force of the Russian Volunteer Army. But Kolchak has a rebellion on the rear, and Denikin's rear is not secure either. All this makes politics in Paris zigzag. Now we read in the newspapers that the Allies recognize all non-Bolshevik governments in Russia and at the same time want to assemble a Russian Constituent Assembly. Everything depends on facts and Denikin's intentions are very clear and definite. My Government believes that we must defend our independence, otherwise we will have the same situation as in the Mountaineers’ Republic. The policy of other republics will not change our decision. We believe in success as we have accurate information that their forces are small and even officer detachments often go over to the side of the Bolsheviks. We have absolutely no fear of the course of action in the present situation. It is necessary to inform the Paris Conference of what has happened and to protest to all neutral countries against the fact that Denikin is sending us armaments intended against the Bolsheviks. Democracy in the West is growing stronger, we cannot be equalized according to Clemenceau. The movement against intervention is growing in England. As for the joint statement, it is necessary to solve it technically: to put before the Conference the question of the actions of the volunteer army, to take measures so that the territory of Dagestan was cleared and an allied commission was sent there to familiarize with the general situation. This will not worsen our attitude towards the Allies. It is necessary to keep in mind the appearance of a new European power in Transcaucasia: Italy has influence, it participates in the Council of Four and we should reveal our will in defending our independence before it. We believe that in the current situation we must defend our independence with arms in our hands and therefore, approving the actions of the Azerbaijani Government in the sense of the movement of troops to the Northern Borders, we intend to support the Azerbaijani Government in its actions against the Volunteer Army. We hope that Azerbaijan will also support us. As for the Mountaineers, it is a different issue, maybe the population itself has already risen. Armenia cannot take an active part either, but we can count on moral support. If we don't agree on this other issue, it means that there is no need for us to gather; everything else will be decided without us. This modus operandi must be found. I am not in favor of provoking Denikin, e.g. to cross the Samur River, but if there is the independence of Transcaucasia, then at any rate Dagestan is part of it.
* Harutyunyan: Noe Vissarionovich talks about Dagestan, but this is hardly satisfying for Alikhan.
* Kantemir: This is a private matter. The main thing is to solve the main issue.
* Ramishvili: Is it acceptable for you to withdraw the Volunteer Army over the river Sulat and agree to form a commission on the Mountain question? Mountain peoples should decide the issue of the Government by themselves.
* Kantemir: Dagestan is a part of the Mountain Union. I believe that it is necessary to speak about the Mountain Republic and Dagestan as a part of it, in which it will live until the decision of the Paris Conference.
* Khoisky: In essence, we are not discussing this issue. If not all republics can discuss it, then what are we going to express? What should be the attitude, what should be the form of participation? I believe that each delegation should put these questions, discuss them, and then bring them to the conference session.
* Ramishvili: But there is a question: if Denikin attacks, will we defend the Mountaineers?
* Khoisky: This is another question. The question of attitude towards the mountaineers and how to be if Denikin will continue to advance is a different question.
* Ramishvili: Of course, if it is desirable, we can dismember them. The situation is as follows: one operation is over, and another one is beginning. The attitude to this issue is that both of them should be put for discussion at the conferences.
Kantemir: There is only one question - the Caucasian question. They want to liquidate us. They want to liquidate all four republics. One of them has already been liquidated and it is us highlanders. We believe that the offensive is coming through us. Denikin is coming towards you. And we ask you whether you will fight him. Maybe you think that he is not fighting with you, that he is not coming at you, but I declare that the front is open for you. The front is open for that blow, which for 3 months we delayed taking upon ourselves. And we must know that because of your attitude, we are reorganizing our political map. We don't care what you do in terms of aid. We're already dead. At one time we asked you for help and you didn't help us. I will not engage in reproaches now, maybe you had your own reasons for doing so. I don't blame you, maybe you couldn't help us. But we were beaten without you. But I don't want you to be beaten separately. I know Denikin won't come after you now. Denikin will wait, he is setting up a base in Petrovsk, but I assure you that in a week he will attack you.
* Mamikonian: This is the first time we are touching upon these grandiose questions about an external offensive and defensive alliance. How can we conclude it when important internal issues have not been resolved? Paper protests are worthless. We can express sympathy with the Highlanders, but nothing will come of it. The question is not Denikin, but the English Command: where it wants this offensive to take place. The British Command removed its mission from Temir-Khan-Shura, and the offensive began. What is being done here now contradicts what the Allies say in the West in the newspapers/reads "recognition of the borders of new state formations"/. Then how can Denikin attack and the British take responsibility for allowing him to attack? It is all thought out in advance. It seems to me personally that the cause of the Highlanders is lost: what can be done when among the Highlanders officers and generals go over to the side of the Volunteers? We don't seem to have any that would change, but if they did, there would be nothing we could do.
* Kantemir: Not all the population cross and not all the officers.
* Mamikonyan: If the Khan of Nakhchivan holds a certain position, then in the Nakhchivan district it will make an impression. We can't do anything about the issue of the highlanders. As for active intervention, of course, Denikin will not move on Baku, because English troops are there. He has a serious task in the North, which he will not be allowed to divert his forces. My Russian orientation is known, but I am in favor of an agreement, not to be beaten. By way of agreement, I prefer the Russians to others, but our Government is of a different view. It is necessary to continue this work, but then the Conference will turn into a Total Caucasian Government. These works require agreement between us and discussion of these questions by our Governments.
Paper protests alone will lead to nothing. The English are moving us like checkers. I think that we should not make hasty decisions. I must point out that the Georgian Government did not ask us when it occupied the territories, so we do not know whether it occupied them correctly. And in the future, such steps should be by common consent, since we are responsible for them.
* Ramishvili: Since the matter concerns the Georgian Republic I would ask Stepan Grigorievich not to worry and since the matter concerns the offensive it should not bother the Caucasus Conference. You should only categorically say what you think about defending independence. After all, there is a certain attempt at our independence here. I maintain that the English order is nine-tenths personal. There is the general question of whether our independence will be recognized and the other question is protest. The "paper protest," as they call it here, will be of great importance in Europe. There must be an appeal to the democracies of the world because if there is Clemenceau today, it doesn't mean it will be there in a month. There may be an Albert Toma or a Viviani, we know their attitude to our issues. And we want to orient ourselves toward a better future.
* Mamikonian: All the republics declared their independence before the 5 Great Powers in Paris. What else is needed? But when I think that we need to help each other, you proudly answer that no help is needed. Then what's the point, what's our work going to be? You're going to bring down Clemenceau's office, we don't do that. We don't know how Toma and Viviani will feel about our questions. If we ourselves create all the friction and protect each other, then this serious task is our common one.
* Khas-Mamedov: I think it's time to stop the debate and put the issues to be discussed tomorrow.
* Tigranian: So, the issue of military actions is withdrawn.
* Ramishvili: It is not removed at all. There is a threat from the side of Denikin. How do we react to it? We have two lines: one diplomatic and the other military.
* Tigranyan: So the military question is raised.
* Harutyunyan: I propose to discuss it in a private meeting.
* Khoisky: We should have a plenary meeting tomorrow night and then a private meeting afterward
* Kantemir: Under these conditions, we consider our stay impossible. And until the 3 republics have not expressed themselves on the issues we have raised, we do not know whether we have any threads of adhesion. I would ask not to discuss any other issues without solving the two questions I have raised.
* Tigranian: So, tomorrow is the plenum of the Conferences to hear the reports of the territorial commission.
* Kantemir: Regarding the meeting of the Conference to discuss the report of the territorial commission on behalf of the Mountain Delegation, I declare that we will not attend this meeting.
The meeting was deferred.
The Chairperson
Secretary
"From the private meeting of the Conferences on May 30, 1919."
Present: N.V. Ramishvili. N.G. Khomeriki. S.G. Mdivani/ Georgia/. M.Yu. Jafarov. F.H. Khoisky. H.B. Has-Mamedov/ Azerbaijan/ S.F. Tigranyan. S. S. Harutyunyan. С. G. Mamikonian/Armenia/. A.H. Kantemir, Aldiyev and Penzulaev/Mount. Rep.
F.Kh. Khoiysky is presiding.
Khoisky: Today we have appointed a private meeting to discuss the question of protecting the Caucasian republics from encroachment on their independence. The question is divided into two parts. The first is a private one about the Mountaineers’ Republic, about the invasion of the Denikin Army into Dagestan, and, in general, about our attitude to the events in the North Caucasus. The second is a general one about the independence of the Transcaucasian Republics. In what order it is desirable to put the discussion of this question?
* Ramishvili: Some delegations have already spoken out yesterday. Now, let's listen to those who have not spoken out, and then we will start making certain judgments.
* Khas-Mamedov: The annulment of the Mountaineers’ Government and occupation of Dagestan cannot be silent. We are ardent supporters of the joint defense of the independence of the Caucasian Republics, and in this regard, we fully join the position taken by the Mountain Government. The form of this defense should be worked out by a special commission.
* Ramishvili: Is this the opinion of both the Delegation of Azerbaijan and its Government?
* Khoisky: This is the opinion of the whole delegation. Although we have not managed to get the consent of the Government during these days, it is unlikely that it will disagree with us, as it raised the issue of defense of independence a month and a half ago, and there is no reason to think that it will reverse its opinion.
* Ramishvili: /to M. Yu. Jafarov/ Mammad Yusuf your conversation with the Prime Minister has been published in the newspapers. Can you inform us on this issue?
* Jafarov: Yes, if it interests you... I have not read what is written in the newspapers, but probably the statement of the conversation is true. Usubbekov [Nesib Bey Yusufbeyli] stated that he demanded the cleansing of Dagestan. Azerbaijani troops have been sent to the borders. Denikin’s to Derbent. All necessary measures were taken to vigorously defend their independence.
* Harutyunyan: I understand Noah Vissarionovich's [Ramishvili] point of view that it is necessary to have the opinion of the Government, not only of the delegation. Today the point of view of the Azerbaijani Delegation precedes the point of view of the Government, allowing referring to the directives. You consider the issue of defense to be a matter for a special commission. Our situation is different. We have directives obliging us to communicate with the Government. I have already stated in the political commission that we must solve the question of political speeches rather than by conferring with the Government. We are bound by these directives. We were given directives to first solve the territorial question and then to proceed to the question of joint declarations.
* Khoisky: So, the Armenian delegation does not consider it possible to speak until it meets with its Government.
* Ramishvili: I would like to know whether the Armenian delegation considers it possible to solve the issue as far as it concerns only the declaration in front of the peace conference regarding Denikin's attack. The second thing I would like to find out is: if there is an attack from Denikin and the Armenian Government does not find it possible to make an active participation, does the Armenian Government guarantee neutrality towards all the states that will be involved in the war, such as the Mountain peoples, Azerbaijan and us.
* Mamikonyan: We discussed what we can say on this issue and decided that the issue of concrete policy is not the task of the Conference. It is the task of the Government. But due to the exceptionality of the moment, we decided to express our opinion. Certainly, in case of a clash between Georgia and other Republics and the Volunteer Army," we will guarantee absolute friendly neutrality to both neighboring republics in the sense that to settle our disputes, we will not take advantage of their predicament and give a reason for internal complications towards the population of Sochi district. We will even try to have a moral influence on our compatriots so that they remain calm. During the first clashes, the Armenian population of this district was reproached with hostility towards Georgians. But the motives of such an attitude of the population were not Political. They were simply reacting to the oppression of one side or the other. This is our opinion about neutrality and I think, also our Government's.
* Harutyunyan: If we have no power to decide the question of action, there can be no doubt that our Government will not have a different opinion on the question of neutrality.
* Tigranian: This issue cannot be finally solved by a mere exchange of opinions. The Delegation cannot guarantee anything and the question of neutrality must be the subject of a special agreement. As for our sentiments, you should not doubt them.
* Ramishvili: I am putting these questions together because, in a close circle and a common environment, their resolution in one form or another is important for the unification of Transcaucasia. There is still a question which you have the right to answer especially since the Minister of Foreign Affairs is here: the question of addressing the Paris Conference. Otherwise, the other republics will have to speak now without waiting for the Armenian Delegation.
* Khoyskiy: The delegations' opinions have clarified two questions: about the Republic of the Mountain Peoples, and the further defense of the independence of our republics. Now it is necessary to find out in what form we should pour the speeches on the defense of our independence. It is necessary to indicate the concrete forms.
* Ramishvili: I have a proposal: to make a vigorous protest before the Peace Conference about the fact that the Army of Denikin is using arms and shells given to it by the Allies to fight against the Bolsheviks against the small newly formed states.
Besides, I have another proposal: we would consider it desirable in what form this should be done - another question - that the Army of Denikin should be withdrawn from the regions of these republics and Allied troops should be stationed there.
Finally: we should immediately start military preparations/announce partial mobilization, etc./and be ready for defense.
* Jafarov: Since the issue requires immediate resolution, maybe the Armenian Delegation will find it possible to get the necessary directives from its Government on the direct issue.
* Tigranian: If this protest should be announced in the coming days, we can't do anything. The Political Commission of the Conference in its work should wait for the known results of the work of the territorial commission, and then something can be done. This issue is purely political and it is impossible to find out anything by negotiations on a direct matter. Under our constitution, the Foreign Minister is limited in his right, and political questions are decided by the whole cabinet. This is justified by the fact that we have a coalition cabinet. The government without negotiation with the convention cannot say anything. Then I think that it is not the tact that has been given. The movement of the volunteer army south of Derbent needs not a little time.
* Harutyunyan: Maybe you will take into consideration our situation. Now, the actions of the Volunteer Army concern the limits of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Can't we limit ourselves to the protest of the interested parties, and in the meantime, we will find out the attitude of our Government?
* Ramishvili: It is clear in itself; that we are not interested in cutting off the conferences. Since there is no solidarity, we will have to speak from the Governments that are interested / I don't know if Alihan [Kantemir] will speak on this issue/ We can't wait. We have to talk to someone who has a definite opinion, and the Conference will deal with the issues it has dealt with so far.
* Kantemir: It seems to me that the Conference is the supreme body heading the Caucasus and it has the right to make such statements. The statement on this issue of Denikin's invasions should be divided into diplomatic and military. For the diplomatic statement, the Conference is competent, and all the Governments have already spoken on this question at the first session on the Mountaineers, and the Conference can do it. But for the military statements, it is necessary to have the decisions of the Governments and it is more the business of the Governments than of the Conference. It would be more important to make a statement as soon as possible for us, Mountaineers, in particular, before Denikin has organized his base in our region, so the issue can be resolved. And I think that a diplomatic statement can be made without asking the Governments.
* Khomeriki: Such a diplomatic statement can and should be made. Armenians protested at the first intervention against the Mountaineers. Now, when the Mountaineers’ Republic is occupied, the protest should be even sharper. I would like to know whether the directives expected by the Armenian Delegation regarding an active involvement or a certain agreement also concern diplomatic statements and whether the Armenian Delegation has already taken the necessary measures to receive these directives from its Government.
* Tigranian: We think that it would be quite logical and psychological to ask the Government whether we have reached an agreement on other issues (e.g. bonds, etc.). We find that also on the question of diplomatic intervention, we have to wait for the instructions of our Government and we may have to go to Erivan. We cannot do paperwork alone. This issue in all its complexity must be discussed by the Government.
* Ramishvili: I understand that, but there is another side; if the Conference cannot find a common language in the main issue, then there are fears that it will not find it in another issue either. They say that diplomatic statements are only a paper protest. The English are not aware of all that is going on or are not aware of the English Command but of such persons as Gen. Briggs, who himself has declared that he speaks on behalf of Denikin and has no other authority. In this respect, the protest of the conference might have an influence. If you have the opportunity to join the protest, it would bind us even more closely together.
* Mamikonyan: The directives of the Armenian Government were stated in a reply note to the Azerbaijani Government one and a half months ago: The Armenian Government stated that political joint statements could take place when a territorial agreement was concluded. This is not the main issue of the Conference. In my opinion, it does not even concern the Conference but is a question of concrete policy of the Government. I, as a delegate, do not consider myself entitled to usurp the rights of the Government, which is responsible for its policy. Whether it wants to protest, in what form, is up to it. We are here to do some work, not to react to individual, everyday acts. The Georgian delegation is in a particularly favorable environment. It can always consult with its Government and back. The Georgian Government has known the facts since May 23rd, while we knew them yesterday. So many things are not clear to us. We sympathize with the Georgian Government, but everyone has his policy. The Mountain Government will not benefit from the statement but will be harmful. The attitude of the English commanders to Denikin's first offensives was unclear, but now that they are happening with their knowledge, and perhaps even blessing, things are changing.
Concerning Georgia and Azerbaijan we have a deep conviction that this intervention will not be not so soon, and we have enough time to take the paths on which the conferences first took. If the issue comes from the union, I believe that it should be preceded by economic agreements and the lack of support. We can solve all this soon. In territorial matters, everything depends on goodwill; whatever our Government tells you, we will fulfill. We will go slowly but surely.
* Ramishvili: You want to give away the events. Wait, but it is possible that we will be in the middle of discussing territorial issues, and God knows what will be done. You can say that you are not responsible for the Sochi front and that we are to blame. But since the matter concerns Azerbaijan, you have no moral basis to say that they are to blame and let them deal with it themselves. The only thing you can reproach Usubbekov with is opportunistic policy. And if this is the case, there is no reason to wait. On our side, we should help them without waiting.
We have every right to protest at the Paris Conference, and I believe it would strengthen our Conference. If we are to be given away like the Mountaineers, agreements with us can only be for charity.
* Kantemir: We are not asking for charity, and we are not for that at all.
* Ramishvili: You interrupted me; I want to say that then there will be no government with which an economic agreement could be concluded. Your protest is not justified.
* Tigranian: The question is not whether any detachment threatens some villages, but whether the republics are doomed to exist. If Russia is strengthened, then we can regret that we fought. The issue is that Russia has not returned to Transcaucasia as a state. This can be solved only in such a way that the republics are put in such a position that the Paris Conference would see itself in front of the fact of the existence of these republics. The Russian question is now on the agenda of the Paris Conference. The Conference is more likely to offend Georgia, Armenia, etc. than Russia and to give us information about our viability, to show that a forcible accession to Russia would be an act of suicide. The note is not enough for this. The Paris Conference has other information about us, about our disputes, about our inability to live independently. We must work in this respect. The question is not Denikin, but the return of Russia. We must try to get Europe to recognize our independence, to put it before the fact of a properly organized political life. We have to work hard in the sense of harmonization. If we manage to advertise our unity before Europe, it will be more important than notes of protest. It is important to get stronger before Russia.
* Kantemir: Whatever the external conditions, whatever the European reaction, the attitude of the Caucasian peoples is the same. Black is always black. The truth is always the truth. Denikin's reaction threatens all Caucasian peoples equally and such Russia, if it revives, will swallow up everything in the 1914 borders, and I think that we should also speak out. I am saying this not because we are Mountaineers, but because I am taking your point of view. All the more I have the right to do so because I was a member of the Transcaucasian Seim. Events can go beyond the Government. It's about the interests of the Armenian people. It's our common interest. On the other hand, the Caucasian question is not Georgian, not Armenian, but a question as a whole. If the Conference does not put the question point-blank, then the impression will be that the Caucasian peoples are not united and cannot live independently. We are interested in your active participation because we have already suffered. In the 30s the North Caucasus was considered subdued. However, thanks to Yermolov's tactics, the Russians had to fight for another 20 years. Regarding the economic connection, the Transcaucasus, and Georgia in particular, depends on the North Caucasus. You may not speak to us, but you will speak to our peoples. Addressing the Armenian Delegation, I repeat that I find it necessary to make a diplomatic statement, especially for us Mountaineers.
* Khoysky: I propose to end the discussion of this issue. In the current situation, I would propose to make a concrete proposal.
* Tigranian: I would ask for permission to make clarifications. Our point of view can be understood as a challenge. But I ask you to believe that it is the result of a long discussion. To what extent? Azerbaijan and Georgia are interested in their borders. Armenia is also interested. We have to do everything to defend our independence, but we have to ask our government because we are bound by directives. When we assure complete neutrality and ask the Government for a joint statement, we ask that our assurances be believed.
* Khas-Mamedov: There is no agreement on this issue of all three. Further discussion should be withdrawn altogether or temporarily, pending receipt of directives from our Government.
* Tigranyan: We don't involve you, as it may delay you.
* Kantemir: We have received private information that members of the Mountaineers’ Government have been detained and forbidden to leave Temirhan-Shura. I would very much request to discuss the following issue: our participation in the Conference and, secondly, the attitude of the Conference to the issue of our withdrawal before you.
* Jafarov: I would like to pass this proposal to the Credentials Committee.
* Harutyunyan: We have no data to discuss these issues now.
* Khoysky: The question concerning the participation of the Mountaineers’ Republic is temporarily withdrawn.
* Khas-Mamedov: I propose to discuss it in the Presidium.
The proposal is accepted.
The meeting unanimously decides to wait until the Armenian delegates receive a directive from their government.
The meeting was deferred...
Chairperson
Secretary